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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on crime and enforcement. It emphasizes the
impact of enforcement tools on two types of crime: Organized and corporate crimes.
In the first chapter "Crime, Corruption and Optimal Leniency", we emphasize
the role of leniency programs as a legal tool to fight illegal activities involving the
bribery of a public official. The impact of different institutional designs of leniency
programs on the level of illegal activity and on the level of corruption is assessed. We
show that a leniency program, that is not well designed, may have the perverse effect
of increasing the level of illegal activity, and under certain institutional designs, it
would imply higher levels of corruption. Furthermore, a benevolent legislator, who
aims to reduce the levels of crime and the related corruption, would set the leniency
rate to its minimum levels and would allow only the criminal to apply for leniency
when leniency is offered after the detection of the illegal activity.
In the second chapter "On Corporate Crime, Compliance Programs and Cor-
porate Reputation", we study the impact of the loss of corporate reputation that
follows the detection of a corporate crime on the design of compliance program and
the managerial incentives within the firm. We show that if the return from the
crime and the reputational loss are high, the firm relies on a "window-dressing"
compliance program, thus leading to inefficient investment in compliance associated
with high levels of corporate misconduct. When the reputational loss is moderate,
the compliance program exhibits a deterrent effect on corporate crime. If the crime
leads to low (high) returns and large (low) reputational loss, the firm will not imple-
ment a compliance program, making the managerial incentives the sole tool affecting
corporate crime.
In the third chapter "Corporate Crime: Incentives and Deterrents", we present
a review of the economic, law and economics and managerial literature that studied
the question of corporate crime. In particular, we shed light on the incentives and the
deterrents that affect the firm’s decision to undertake a corporate crime. We analyze,
first, the determinants that stem from the agency relationship between the firm and
the manager, namely the managerial incentives, organizational structure and the
role of senior managers. Second, we consider the determinants that are exogenous
to the firm but affect its incentives to commit the corporate crime. We focus notably
on legal deterrents, corporate reputation and corporate social responsibility.
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Chapter 1
Crime, Corruption and Optimal
Leniency 1
1.1 Introduction
Organized crime is prevalent in developing and post-conflict countries and generally
in countries suffering from weak rule of law. It constitutes as well a concern for
developed countries that adapt continuously their institutions to confront this type
of crimes. According to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Orga-
nized Crime, organized crime groups are defined as "structured groups committing
serious crime for profit". However, this definition could be extended to highlight
other features of organized crime such as the reference to violence, the corruption
of public officials, the intervention in the formal economy and in the political arena
(Van Dijk, 2007). Examples of organized crime include, among others, trafficking in
drugs, in humans, in firearms, in natural resources and cybercrime (UNODC, 2011).
One of the determinants of the expansion of organized crime is the level of cor-
ruption of the public sector in the economy. Indeed, Dijk and Buscaglia (2003)
constructed an index for the level of organized crime and an index of public sector
corruption and they identified high correlation between the two phenomena. This
result is confirmed by (Van Dijk, 2007) that considers corruption and organized
crime as "two sides of the same coin". Different reasons justify the interdependence
between crime and corruption; criminals could bribe public officials to get higher
levels of protection from law enforcement, to exploit their influence in the decision
making process or to facilitate the circulation of the illegal goods. Particularly, the
linkage between crime and corruption of public sector can take five forms according
to Dijk and Buscaglia (2003). It ranges from "sporadic acts of bribery" which in-
volves low ranking public officials in order to get a single favor that facilitates the
illegal activity to "State’s capture" where the law making and the judicial decisions
can be shaped in favor of the illegal groups.
1I am grateful to the participants of the PhD Seminar at the University of Bologna, the Central
European Program in Economic Theory (2016), the Swiss IO Day (2016), the 6th Euro-African
Conference in Economics and Finance and the 11th Anuual Conference of the Italian Society of
Law and Economics for their helpful comments.
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This crime-corruption nexus suggests that when it comes to the design of law
enforcement policies, both problems should not be considered separately. The policy
maker should take into account the mutual impact between the two issues. Nev-
ertheless, in terms of policies, for example, few EU members focused on the link
between crime and corruption in the design of the initiatives and policies that aim
to fight both problems (Gounev and Bezlov, 2010). In terms of economic literature,
few papers considered the effect of policies tackling one of these issues on the other
one (e.g. Kugler et al., 2005). For instance, the corruption, by definition, is a mul-
tiagent crime. Thus, a possible way to control for corruption is through exploiting
the insider information between the agents involved in this act by offering a lenient
treatment for the agent who discloses this information (Rose-Ackerman, 2010). This
sort of leniency programs has shown a success in the fight against cartels in the an-
titrust (Spagnolo, 2008) as well as in the fight against organized crime (Acconcia
et al., 2014). Yet, the application of a leniency program to curb corruption could
have an undesired effect on the level of crimes due to the crime-corruption nexus
discussed above.
The present paper investigates the impact of leniency programs on the the level
of corruption and on the level of illegal activity. For this purpose, we consider, in
the benchmark case, a model that consists of a criminal and a public official. On
the one hand, the criminal decides whether to commit an illegal activity and to pay
a bribe to the public official in order to get a higher protection from investigations
or not. On the other hand, the public official’s strategic decision is whether to ac-
cept or to reject the bribe, this decision depends on a private cost that he has to
handle. We then extend this model by introducing two different designs of leniency
programs: an asymmetric leniency program and a symmetric leniency program for
corruption. Both programs allow the applicant to get a reduction in the sanctions
for the corruption he was involved in. However, the main difference is that in the
former only the criminal can apply for leniency, while in the latter both players can
apply. These variants of the baseline model enables us to analyze the impact these
reduced sanctions have on the decision of the criminal and on that of the public
official. In a later step, we consider the benevolent legislator’s problem in order to
define the optimal design of leniency program that a benevolent would implement
to reduce the levels of crime and of corruption.
We show that a leniency program that is not well designed could be exploited by
the players. Particularly, leniency rates that are too high would increase the level
of illegal activity, regardless of the leniency program implemented, compared to a
benchmark with no leniency. This is due to the dominance of a "leniency effect"
that decreases the expected sanction a criminal has to bear following his application
to a leniency program. As a result, leniency programs might increase the level of
illegal activity if they are not well designed. Moreover, under a symmetric leniency
program, a too generous leniency program would imply higher levels of corruption.
Furthermore, we show that, to maximize the social welfare function, a benevolent
legislator would set the leniency rate to the minimum level and would offer the le-
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niency only to the criminal.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on crime and corruption of pub-
lic officials by considering the role of leniency programs in the control for the levels of
crime and of corruption, i.e., this paper sheds light on the effectiveness of a leniency
program inter-crime and intra-crime. Moreover, we introduce a heterogeneity on the
level of the public official. This heterogeneity allows to endogenize the probability of
corrupt public official and thus to control for the level of corruption in the economy
and to identify separately the impact of different policies on the corruption and on
the illegal activity. Finally, different institutional designs could be introduced to our
set-up. For instance, we can consider leniency post-detection of the illegal activity
or pre-detection.
Our paper is related to the literature on organized crime and the corruption of
public officials. To some extent, these papers overlooked the role of sanctioning the
criminal organization for bribing the public official on both the level of corruption
and the level of criminal activity. For instance, Kugler et al. (2005) consider the
impact of sanctioning crimes on both the level of crimes and the level of corrup-
tion in a setting where criminal organizations compete imperfectly with each other
on criminal activities, while acting as local monopsonies in the corruption market.
They show that when the return of crimes is relatively high compared to the cost of
bribing public officials, a policy that increases the expected sanction may have the
perverse effect of increasing criminal activity. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness
of law enforcement policies against crimes in an environment where the corruption
is pervasive, these policies should go in parallel with measures to fight corruption.
Acconcia et al. (2014) studies the optimal design of an accomplice witnesses pro-
gram in a context where the criminal activity is committed by a vertically structured
organization and the public official could be corruptible. The accomplice witness
program aims to reduce the level of criminal activity through increasing the proba-
bility of convicting the boss by inducing the fellow to cooperate with the law enforcer
in exchange of a reduced fine. In contrast to Kugler et al. (2005), the extent of cor-
ruption is not strategically determined by the criminal organization. They show that
the optimal leniency offered to the fellow is increasing with the level of corruption
since the later reduces the likelihood of conviction of the boss in the absence of co-
operation. A more generous leniency is thus required to compensate this reduction
through increasing the level of cooperation into the program.
Our model differentiates from these models on several aspects. First, we consider
sanctioning the criminal organization for corruption in addition to the measures al-
ready set to fight the criminal activity. This allows us to investigate the impact
of different designs of leniency programs on both the level of illegal activity and
the level of corruption. Second, in contrast to the leniency program considered in
(Acconcia et al., 2014), we consider a leniency program in the case of two asymmet-
ric interdependent crimes where only one of the accomplices have full information
about both of them. Third, the relation considered between the the crime and the
3
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corruption is different; while these models consider the case of regular corruption in
which the corrupt public officials are on the payroll of the criminal organization in
exchange of offering regular services, we consider the corruption of high rank offi-
cials who may accept the bribe in exchange of offering long term benefit or increased
protection to the criminal (Chêne, 2008).
We model the criminal organization following Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) in
considering it as a black box, so we abstract from the vertical structure adopted
in the previous models. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) consider also the impact
of leniency programs on illegal transactions, particularly on the occasional bilateral
sequential transactions. They show that a moderate leniency program would en-
sure the implementation of this type of transaction since it could serve as a credible
threat if the other party of the transaction did not follow the agreement. Lambs-
dorff and Mathias (2007) build on this model to determine the optimal design of
law enforcement policies, i.e., fines and leniency rates, for each of the parties of the
transaction. The illegal activity in these models is conditional on the participation
of the public official and hence the idea of sequential transactions. Nevertheless, in
our model, the gain from bribing the public official is reflected through an increased
protection from the law enforcement. Heterogeneity in the type of the public official
can thus be introduced into the model. Differently from to Buccirossi and Spagnolo
(2006) and Lambsdorff and Mathias (2007) where they focus only on leniency before
the detection of the illegal activity, this heterogeneity enables us to investigate the
impact of post-detection and pre-detection leniency on both the level of corruption
and the level of illegal activity.
Furthermore, introducing a leniency program for reporting corruption is linked
to the recent literature on the asymmetric punishment of bribe (e.g. Oak, 2015;
Dufwenberg and Spagnolo, 2015; Basu et al., 2016). This strand of literature stud-
ies the implications of legalizing bribe giving and increasing punishment on bribe
taking. However, unlike our model, they consider the context of harassment bribes,
i.e., bribes paid to get a service that the bribe giver is entailed to (Dufwenberg and
Spagnolo, 2015). These models show that the reduction of the fine paid by the bribe
giver may imply a perverse effect and increase the level of corruption depending on
the cost of legal recourse, the efficiency of public administration or the level of law
enforcement policies.
Finally, the idea of applying leniency for involvement in illegal activities builds
upon the literature on leniency in antitrust (e.g. Motta and Polo, 2003; Spagnolo,
2004; Chen and Rey, 2013; Harrington, 2013). More precisely, it is related to the
models that considered the impact of leniency on the sustainability of multi-market
collusion (e.g. Lefouili and Roux, 2012). Indeed, in our model we study the impact
of introducing different setting of leniency on the likelihood of committing two in-
terdependent criminal activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 1.2, we set-up the
baseline model where there is no leniency. In section1.3 and section1.4, we consider
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two variants of the model and discuss their impact on the equilibrium levels of
corruption and of illegal activity. In section 1.5, we introduce the legislator’s problem
and define the optimal leniency program. We conclude in section 1.6.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Set-up
We start by introducing the benchmark model where the legislator relies only on
the sanctions of the illegal activity and the sanction of corruption as policy tools to
achieve his objective. We consider a game of three risk neutral players: a benevolent
legislator, a criminal and a public official.
The Legislator. The benevolent legislator aims to reduce the social cost driven
by the illegal activity and the corruption. Thus, he designs the enforcement tools in
a way to keep the illegal activity and the corruption to their minimum levels. The
legislator launches an investigation and detects the evidence of the illegal activity2
with a probability α. In this case, the criminal bears a sanction F i.
We assume that the investigation on corruption follows the investigation on the
illegal activity, i.e., we consider a sequential detection setting. Therefore, if the
evidence of the illegal activity was found, the corruption’s evidence will be detected
with probability β. Otherwise, it will be detected with probability β, such that
β < β. Indeed, the higher probability of finding the evidence of corruption could
stem from the cooperation between different law enforcement departments involved
in the investigation of both cases.
We focus in the model on symmetric sanctions for corruption since the bribe
is paid to facilitate an illegal activity. Accordingly, the legislator sets the sanction
of engaging in corruption denoted by F b, that the criminal and the public official
will face once the evidence of corruption is detected. Furthermore, following the
literature, the sanctions are interpreted in monetary terms.
The Criminal. The criminal decides whether or not to commit an illegal activity,
e.g., drug trafficking, money laundering,...etc. The crime yields a random monetary
return, pi, that is distributed following a CDF G(.) and a pdf g(.).
Moreover, the criminal seeks the protection of a public official by offering him a
bribe, B. B is as exogenous amount that varies between [0, pi] and that satisfies the
participation constraint of the criminal.
The Public Official. The public official decides whether to accept the bribe of-
fered by the criminal or not. If he accepts the bribe, a hard evidence of the corruption
is generated and is detained by the both the criminal and the public official. We
will assume that the public official will always reciprocate by providing the criminal
with a higher level of protection against the law enforcement, so no hold-up problem
2We assume that the evidence of the illegal activity is sufficient to get a successful prosecution,
and thus once this evidence is detected, the criminal will be convicted.
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could arise. In particular, this protection implies a lower probability of detecting
the illegal activity, denoted by α, such that α < α.
By accepting the bribe, the public official faces the risk of losing his formal
wage, w, whenever the corruption is detected by the law enforcer. Moreover, the
involvement in corruption entails an additional cost, θ. θ is the private type of the
public official. For sake of simplicity, we will assume that θ is uniformly distributed
over the support [0, 1]. This additional cost, θ, could be interpreted as the degree of
regional, ethnic or religious difference between the public official and the criminal
(Kugler et al., 2005). Consequently, the more important the difference is, the more
reluctant the public official will be in providing his illegal services to the criminal.
This cost could be interpreted as well as the psychological cost of violating a social
norm (Rotondi and Stanca, 2015).
1.2.2 Timing
The timing of the previous set-up will have the following structure:
τ = 0 The legislator sets the policy parameters: F i, F b, α and β.
τ = 1 The return from the crime, pi, materializes. The criminal, C, decides
whether to commit the crime or not. If he decides not to commit the
crime, the game ends. Otherwise, by committing the crime, the criminal
proceeds by offering a bribe, B, to the public official.
τ = 2 The public official, P.O., observes his type, θ, and decides whether to ac-
cept the bribe, B, paid by the criminal or not. Provided that the public
official accepts the bribe, a higher protection from the investigation will be
guaranteed to the criminal.
τ = 3 An investigation on the illegal activity starts. If the public official accepts
the bribe, the incriminating evidence is detected with probability α. Oth-
erwise, the evidence is detected with probability α > α.
τ = 4 An investigation on the corruption starts. If the evidence of the illegal
activity is discovered, the criminal and the public official will be convicted
for corruption with probability β. Otherwise, the probability of conviction
will be β < β.
The players payoffs can be depicted through the game tree illustrated by Figure
1.1.
We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game by solving it by
backward induction.
1.2.3 Leniency program
In order to determine the optimal leniency program and to assess the effectiveness
of a leniency program as a tool to fight illegal activity and corruption, we study two
variants of this benchmark in sections 1.3 and 1.4. Particularly, we consider two
institutional designs:
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Figure 1.1: The game tree of the benchmark model
L
N
C
No illegal activity
N
P.O.
N
N
Detection of
corruption’s
evidence (β)
No detection
(1− β)
Detection of
the I.A.’s
evidence (α)
N
Detection of
corruption’s
evidence (β)
No detection
(1− β)
No detection
(1− α)
Accepts (θ∗)
N
Detection of
the I.A.’s
evidence (α)
No detection
(1− α)
Rejects (1− θ∗)
Illegal activity (I.A.)+
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)
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) (
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)(
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w +B − θ
)
(
pi − F i
w
) (
pi
w
)
(
C’s payoff
P.O.’s payoff
)
Asymmetric leniency for corruption. In this setting, once the evidence of the
illegal activity is detected the legislator allows only the criminal to apply for leniency.
In that case, the criminal will be subject to a lenient sanction only for the act of
corruption, while he will face full sanction for the illegal activity he committed.
Symmetric leniency for corruption. In this setting, both players can report
the evidence of corruption if the evidence of illegal activity is detected, however only
the first-informant can get a reduced sanction (Chen and Rey, 2013).
The introduction of a leniency program implies that the legislator defines a le-
niency rate q, such that a player who applies for leniency will bear a reduced sanction
(1 − q)F s where s = i, b. This will affect the equilibrium level of corruption and
illegal activity as we will show in details in sections 1.3 and 1.4.
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1.2.4 Benchmark: No Leniency
The equilibrium of the baseline model is determined by solving the previous game
by backward induction. Therefore, we start by defining the public official’s expected
payoff if he accepts the bribe and then, we will identify the marginal type of the
public official who will be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bribe.
A public official of type θ who accepts the bribe receives the following expected
payoff:
pipo = (B − θ) + w − [αβ + (1− α)β](F b + w)
The first two terms of this equation represent the public official’s expected gain from
accepting the bribe, which is the amount of the bribe reduced by the type depen-
dent cost, B− θ, and his formal wage, w, that he will keep if the corruption remains
undetected. The last term represents the public official’s expected loss: When the
public official is caught, he loses his formal job and will be subject to the sanction,
F b. This expected loss depends on both the likelihood that the illegal activity is
detected, α, and the probability of detecting the corruption act, β or β, respectively.
Given that that the payoff of a public official who rejects the bribe is only his
formal wage, w, the marginal type of public official, i.e., the type, θ∗, that is in-
different between accepting and rejecting the bribe, is determined by the following
equation:
θ∗ = B − [αβ + (1− α)β](F b + w) (1.1)
Only a public official of type θ ≤ θ∗ accepts the bribe and provides a protection the
criminal. In other words, for a public official to get involved in the corruption act,
the private cost of accepting the bribe, θ, needs to be sufficiently small such that the
bribe would, at least, compensate him for the expected loss related to this decision.
Furthermore, given our assumption that the type of the public official is uniformly
distributed over the support [0, 1], θ∗ could be interpreted as the probability of ac-
cepting the bribe. Accordingly, this marginal type of public official could serve as a
measure of the level of corruption in the economy.
Moreover, the level of the illegal activity in the economy could be captured
through the profitability of the illegal activity. The expected payoff of the criminal
is captured by the the following equation:
pic = pi − αF i + θ∗{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b} (1.2)
where ∆α = α− α.
This expression could be divided into two parts. The first two terms reflect the
criminal’s payoff if he does not offer a bribe to the public official: the criminal will
enjoy the return of the crime pi, and will face the sanction F i with probability α¯.
The last term represents criminal’s the expected net gain from paying the bribe:
Provided that the public official accepts the bribe, the criminal will enjoy an in-
creasing level of protection, and thus his gain is the difference between the expected
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sanction of the illegal activity when the bribe is rejected, α¯F , and when it is ac-
cepted by the public official, αF . This difference is denoted by (∆α)F i. Yet, the
cost of paying the bribe is the amount of the bribe offered to the public official, B,
and the expected sanction of getting involved in corruption, [αβ + (1− α)β]F b.
Thus, a criminal will commit an illegal activity whenever pic ≥ 0, and the level of
illegal activity could be captured by Pr(pic ≥ 0).
For convenience, we consider the following assumption:
Assumption 1.1.
(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b > 0
which implies the criminal’s participation constraint is satisfied in the baseline
model. In other words, the amount of the bribe is sufficiently small such that the
criminal will always have incentive to commit the illegal activity3.
1.3 Asymmetric Leniency for Corruption
In this section, we build on the baseline model by introducing an "asymmetric
leniency program for corruption". In particular, we consider an institutional design
in which, after the detection of the illegal activity, the legislator allows only the
criminal to get a reduced sanction if he reports the evidence of corruption. Note that
a leniency program is effective if the reduced expected sanction, that the criminal
enjoys by applying to the leniency program, is lower than the expected sanction he
faces otherwise, namely if F i+ (1− q)F b ≤ F i+βF b, which could be reduced to the
condition q ≥ (1− β). Throughout the analysis, we will assume that this condition
holds.
1.3.1 Equilibrium analysis
As in the baseline model, we start the equilibrium analysis by determining the
marginal type of the public official and then the profitability of the illegal activity
under the asymmetric leniency program for corruption.
Given the assumption on the leniency rate, q, reporting the evidence of corruption
is a dominant strategy for the criminal once the illegal activity is detected by the
legislator, which affects the public official’s payoff. The public official’s expected
payoff becomes thus:
pi1po = (B − θ) + w − [1 + (1− α)β](F b + w)
The public official’s payoff can be interpreted as the difference between the expected
gain and the expected cost of the public official from accepting the bribe: From the
one hand, accepting the bribe entails the net gain B − θ. On the other hand, he
is subject to the sanction F b and the loss of his formal wage w with probability
3For a discussion on this assumption, see Appendix 1.A
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[1 + (1 − α)β]. Note that unlike the benchmark, the asymmetric leniency program
raises the probability that the public official faces the sanction F b when the evidence
of the illegal activity is detected. Precisely, the public official will be subject to the
fine with probability 1 instead of β¯.
Given that the public official’s payoff from rejecting the bribe, w, remains unaf-
fected by the new institutional design. We can redefine the marginal type as follows:
θ∗1 = B − [α + (1− α)β](F b + w) (1.3)
Thus, in equilibrium, only a public official with private cost θ ≤ θ∗1 will accept the
bribe. Indeed, the private cost of the bribe needs to be sufficiently low to ensure
that the public official will receive at least the same payoff that he gets by rejecting
the bribe.
At this stage, we can determine the profitability of the illegal activity under an
asymmetric leniency program. This payoff is:
pi1c (q) = pi − αF i + θ∗1{(∆α)F i −B − [α(1− q) + (1− α)β]F b} (1.4)
Under the asymmetric leniency program, the criminal’s payoff depends on his payoff
if no bribe is offered, pi − αF i, as well as on the expected net gain from offering
the bribe which the protection the criminal receives against the sanction, (∆α)F i,
reduced by the amount of the bribe, B, and the expected sanction of corruption
[α(1− q) + (1−α)β]F b. Note that the criminal will face the sanction F b with prob-
ability (1 − q) if the evidence of the illegal activity is discovered instead β¯, which
reflects the reduction in the criminal’s expected sanction following the implementa-
tion of the asymmetric leniency program.
In equilibrium, a criminal commits thus an illegal activity whenever pi1c (q) ≥ 0.
1.3.2 Assessment of the institutional design
In this subsection, we assess the effectiveness of the asymmetric leniency program
by investigating its impact on both the level of corruption and the level of the illegal
activity compared to the benchmark where non leniency program was implemented.
For this purpose, we will compare the probability of accepting the bribe and the
profitability of the illegal activity under both settings.
An asymmetric leniency program reduces the level of corruption compared to
the benchmark case. From equations (1.1) and (1.3), we get;
θ∗1 − θ∗ = −α(1− β)(F b + w) < 0 (1.5)
This result is derived from the fact that the leniency program is effective: Expecting
that the criminal will report the evidence of corruption whenever the evidence of the
illegal activity is detected, the public official accepts the bribe less likely. Indeed,
the criminal’s application to the program implies that the public official will bear
the full sanction, F b, and the loss of his formal wage, w, with certainty after the
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discovery of the illegal activity. As a result, only public official with low private cost
will have incentive to engage in the bribery act and to face the higher expected fine,
this will be reflected by a lower probability of accepting the bribe and thus a lower
level of corruption.
Yet, the impact of the asymmetric leniency on the level of illegal activity is
ambiguous; it depends on the level of the leniency rate. From equations (1.2) and
(1.4) we have;
pi1c (q)− pic = (θ∗1 − θ∗){(∆α)F i −B − {[αβ + (1− α)β]F b} − θ∗1α[β − (1− q)]F b}
The introduction of an asymmetric leniency program affects the profitability of the
illegal activity through two channels:
The first channel is the "Corruption effect". It is depicted through the 1st term
of the previous equation. Indeed, following the introduction of a new institutional
design, the change in the probability of accepting the bribe affects, in turn, the like-
lihood that the criminal enjoys the protection against the illegal activity’s sanction,
which affects his decision to undertake the illegal activity. For instance, the imple-
mentation of an asymmetric leniency program reduces the probability that a bribe is
accepted by a public official, i.e. reduces the likelihood of corruption in the economy.
This results in a reduction of the probability that the criminal will enjoy the net
gain from the bribery, (∆α)F i −B, which undermines the expected profitability of
the illegal activity compared to the benchmark of no leniency program. Thus, the
corruption effect implies a negative impact on the level of the illegal activity.
The second channel is the "leniency effect", which is captured by {[αβ + (1 −
α)β]F b} − θ∗1α[β − (1 − q)]F b}. This effect results from the change, basically the
reduction, in the criminal’s expected sanction of corruption that follows the intro-
duction of a leniency program for a given level of corruption. As expected, the more
generous a leniency program is, the higher will be this effect and thus the higher
will be the profitability of the illegal activity to the criminal. This negative effect of
the leniency program on the level of illegal activities has been highlighted by several
models that discussed the possibility of exploiting a leniency program, (e.g. Chen
and Rey, 2013).
The overall impact of an asymmetric leniency program on the level of the illegal
activity in the economy is the net result of both effects. It is worthy to note that
only the leniency effect depends on the design of the leniency program: The larger
the leniency rate, the lower will be the criminal’s expected sanction of corruption
and thus the larger would be the leniency effect. Consequently, for lower levels
of leniency rates, the "corruption effect" dominates the "leniency effect" resulting
in lower profitability of the illegal activity compared to the case where there is no
leniency. The asymmetric leniency program will exhibit thus a deterrent effect by
reducing the level of illegal activity in the economy.However, a sufficiently generous
leniency programs will imply the dominance of the "leniency effect" leading thus to
higher levels of illegal activity.
The results of this subsection are summarized by the following proposition:
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Proposition 1.1. The introduction of an asymmetric leniency program for corrup-
tion reduces the probability that the public official accepts the bribe. However, for
the profitability of the illegal activity, there exists a leniency rate, q˜, above which it
increases with the implementation of the leniency program.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.1. 
1.4 Symmetric Leniency for Corruption
In this section, we consider another design of the leniency program: a "symmetric
leniency for corruption". Under this setting, once the illegal activity is detected,
the legislator allows both the criminal and the public official to apply for leniency.
However, the reduction in the corruption’s sanctions are guaranteed only to the
1st informant who reports the evidence of corruption. Therefore, the probability
that each player gets the reduction in the sanction is 1/2. Table 1.2 illustrates the
reporting game between the criminal and the public official. The 1st line in each cell
represents the criminal’s expected sanction after the detection of the illegal activity
while the 2nd line represents the public official’s expected sanction.
Table 1.2: Reporting game in a symmetric leniency program
HHHHHHC
P.O. Report Not Report
Report −F
i − (1− q/2)F b −F i − (1− q)F b
−(1− q/2)F b −F b
Not Report −F
i − F b −F i − βF b
−(1− q)F b −βF b
From table 1.2, we can infer that for Report to be a dominant strategy for both
players, the leniency rate needs to be sufficiently high, namely q ≥ (1 − β). We
assume that this condition is satisfied throughout the following analysis.
1.4.1 Equilibrium analysis
The implications of this institutional design on the analysis in the previous sections
are reflected through the change in equilibrium value of the public official’s marginal
type, that determines the probability that corruption occurs, and the equilibrium
value of the criminal’s.
Under a symmetric leniency program, a public official of type θ who accepts the
bribe gets the following expected payoff:
pi2po = B − θ + w − α[(1−
q
2
)F b + w]− (1− α)β(F b + w)
As in the previous section, this payoff can be interpreted as the difference between
the public official’s expected gain, B − θ + w, and his expected loss, the last two
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terms, from accepting the bribe. it is worthy to note that unlike the previous in-
stitutional designs, the public official’s payoff depends on the leniency rate, q, since
the symmetric leniency program allows him to apply for lenient treatment.
The marginal type of the public official, who is indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the bribe, is determined through the following equation:
θ∗2(q) = B − (1− α)β(F b + w)− α[(1− q
2
)F b + w] (1.6)
Accordingly, in equilibrium, a public official will get involved in corruption if his
type is sufficiently low; θ ≤ θ∗2, such that the bribe, B, compensates him for at
least the expected sanction of accepting the bribe.
The expected revenue of the criminal who performs the illegal activity is:
pi2c (q) = pi − αF i + θ∗2{(∆α)F i −B − [α(1−
q
2
) + (1− α)β]F b} (1.7)
It reflects the criminal’s net gain from the illegal activity if no bribe is accepted (1st
and 2nd terms of the previous equation) as well as his expected net gain from offering
the bribe. Clearly, this criminal’s expected revenue should exceed his outside option
that is normalized to zero, in order to undertake the illegal activity. Thus, the level
of illegal activity, in equilibrium, would be captured by the probability Pr(pi2c ≥ 0).
1.4.2 Assessment of the institutional design
The comparison between the marginal type of the public official and the profitability
of the illegal activity under this set-up and under the benchmark case sheds light on
the effect of a symmetric leniency program on the level of corruption and the level
of illegal activity.
The impact of the leniency program on the probability of accepting the bribe is
captured by the following equation:
θ∗2(q)− θ∗ = −α(1− β)w + α[β − (1− q
2
)]F b (1.8)
Unlike the case of asymmetric leniency, this institutional design allows the public
official to report the evidence of corruption once the illegal activity is discovered in
exchange of a reduced sanction. Thus, the public official’s payoff and the probability
of accepting the bribe will depend on the leniency rate set by the legislator. Indeed,
compared to the setting of no leniency, the probability of accepting the bribe is
affected in two respects.
First, provided that the illegal activity is detected, the implementation of a
leniency program implies the loss of the formal wage, w, with certainty since for an
effective leniency program the evidence of corruption will be reported either by the
public official or the criminal. This entails a negative effect on the probability of
accepting the bribe, which is represented by the 1st term of the RHS of equation
(1.8).
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Second, the leniency program reduces the public official’s expected sanction of
corruption (2nd term of the RHS of equation (1.8)), which has a positive effect on
the probability of accepting the bribe. This positive effect is increasing with the
leniency rate.
Accordingly, for low leniency rates,(1 − β) ≤ q ≤ q, the negative effect of the
symmetric leniency program on the public official’s expected payoff dominates the
positive effect implying the reduction of the level of corruption compared to the case
of no leniency. However, for relatively high leniency rates(q > q¯), the positive effect
dominates and higher levels of corruption can be expected.
The impact of the symmetric leniency program on the profitability of the illegal
activity is represented by the difference between equations (1.7) and (1.2) as shown
below:
pi2c (q)−pic = (θ∗2(q)−θ∗){(∆α)F i−B−{[αβ+(1−α)β]F b}−θ∗2(q)α[β−(1−
q
2
)]F b}
(1.9)
As in the case of an asymmetric leniency, equation (1.9), shows that a symmetric
leniency program affects the profitability of the illegal activity through a "corruption
effect" and a "leniency effect".
Yet, unlike the case of asymmetric leniency, the corruption effect depends on the
level of the leniency rate. More precisely, for (1− β) ≤ q ≤ q, the corruption effect
will imply a reduction in the expected profitability of the illegal activity since over
this interval of leniency rates, the probability that a public official accepts a bribe
decreases compared to the benchmark. In other words, the probability that the
criminal enjoys the net gain of offering a bribe decreases reducing thus his incentive
to commit the illegal activity. Nonetheless, the probability enjoying the net gain of
bribe increases for q ≥ q, leading to the increase of the profitability of the illegal
activity. The corruption effect is captured by the 1st term of the RHS of equation
(1.9).
As already mentioned, the "leniency effect", represented by the 3rd and 4th terms
of the RHS of equation (1.9), is increasing in the leniency rate and it increases the
profitability of the illegal activity by increasing the probability that the criminal
enjoys a lenient treatment.
In a nutshell, the impact of a symmetric leniency program on the profitability
of the illegal activity is the result of the net effect of the "corruption effect" and
the"leniency effect" as shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. For a given leniency rate, the impact of a symmetric leniency
program on the level of corruption and illegal activity compared to the case of no
leniency, can be summarized as follows:
1. For (1− β) ≤ q ≤ q, a symmetric leniency program reduces both the probabil-
ity that the public official accepts the bribe and the profitability of the illegal
activity.
2. For q < q ≤ q, a symmetric leniency program reduces the probability of accept-
ing the bribe while increases the profitability of the illegal activity.
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3. For q < q ≤ 1, a symmetric leniency program backfires, it increases both the
probability that the public official accepts the bribe and the profitability of the
illegal activity.
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.2. 
1.5 Optimal Leniency Program
The full characterization of the equilibrium under a leniency program requires the
determination of the optimal leniency rate that a benevolent legislator would select
to maximize his welfare function. Indeed, we assume that the social cost of the illegal
activity and the corruption are sufficiently high that a legislator’s objective would be
to minimize the level of both the illegal activity and the corruption. Therefore, the
legislator chooses a leniency rate that makes the criminal’s participation constraint
to the illegal activity as stringent as possible and that reduce the public official’s
expected payoff from corruption such that only very low types accept the bribe.
Moreover, the optimal leniency rate ensures that the leniency program is effective
and that no positive rewards are allowed. The legislator’s program is thus:
Min
q
{Pr(pisc(q) > 0) + Pr(θ < θ∗s)} where s = 1, 2
s.t. (1− β) ≤ q ≤ 1
The full description of the equilibrium under the institutional designs studied in
sections 1.3 and 1.4 is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3. The optimal leniency rate is:
q∗ = 1− β
Under an asymmetric leniency program for corruption, there exists a unique equi-
librium: q∗, θ∗1 and pi∗1c , where θ∗1 is given by (1.3), and
pi∗1c = pi − αF i + θ∗{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b}
Furthermore, under a symmetric leniency program, there exists a unique equilibrium
given by q∗, θ∗2 and pi∗2c , where
θ∗2 = B − [α + (1− α)β](F b + w) + α(1− β)
2
F b and
pi∗2c = pi − αF i + θ∗{(∆α)F i −B − [α + (1− α)β]F b +
α(1− β)
2
F b
Finally, at q∗ = 1− β, we have:
θ∗1 < θ∗2
pi∗1c < pi
∗2
c
Proof. See Appendix 1.B.3 
15
CHAPTER 1. CRIME, CORRUPTION AND OPTIMAL LENIENCY
The 1st and the 2nd parts of proposition 1.3 show that a legislator will set the
leniency rate at the minimum level either under an asymmetric leniency program or
under a symmetric one. Indeed, in both cases, this leniency rate will be sufficient
to trigger a desirable corruption effect: Under an asymmetric leniency program, the
public official’s payoff is independent from the leniency rate. However, the mere
implementation of the asymmetric leniency program reduces the public official’s ex-
pected payoff from the corruption by raising his probability of facing the corruption
sanction when the illegal activity is detected. Furthermore, under a symmetric le-
niency program, where the public official can apply for leniency, the leniency rate
1− β¯ will be sufficient to deter the public official from the corruption by raising the
probability of loosing his formal wage due to the race to the courthouse between the
criminal and the public official. Yet, this optimal leniency rate is not high enough to
make the reduction in the public official’s expected sanction dominate the effect of
the loss of the wage. Therefore, the optimal leniency rate, 1− q, ensures a reduction
in the level of corruption regardless of the type of leniency program applied. This in
turn triggers a corruption effect that reduces the criminal’s incentive to commit the
illegal activity by reducing the probability that he enjoys the net gain of the bribe.
The 3rd part underlines that it is optimal for a benevolent legislator to offer an
ex-post leniency only for the criminal in order to minimize the level of corruption and
the level of illegal activity. Indeed, for a given leniency rate, under an asymmetric
leniency program, the public official never enjoys a lenient treatment and therefore
his payoff from the corruption is always lower than under a symmetric leniency
program. Thus, an asymmetric leniency program has a more deterrent effect on the
level of corruption than a symmetric leniency program. As a result of the lower
corruption level, the criminal exerts lower levels of illegal activity.
1.6 Conclusion
The interdependence between crime and corruption suggests that strategies adopted
to fight them should consider this relationship. In this paper, we attempted to assess
the effectiveness of leniency programs as a tool to fight illegal activities involving
the corruption of the public official.
We show that a leniency program if it is not well designed could backfire. Par-
ticularly, leniency rates that are too high could increase the level of illegal activity.
A too generous leniency program reduces the expected sanction that a criminal has
to bear since the criminal will always exploit the leniency program and disclose
the evidence of corruption to enjoy the lower fines. This "leniency effect" implies
a negative effect on the level of the illegal activity. Moreover, under a symmetric
leniency program, to which both the criminal and the public official can apply, a too
generous leniency program would imply higher levels of corruption. Indeed, under
this leniency program the public official can enjoy the fine reduction as well, which
might raise his expected payoff from the corruption. Furthermore, we show that, to
maximize the welfare function, a legislator would select the minimum leniency rate
and would offer the leniency only to the criminal.
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One of the limitation of our model is the assumption imposed on the legislator’s
payoff function. By assuming that the social cost of both the illegal activity and
the corruption are high, we restricted the legislator’s objective to the reduction of
the level of both acts. We disregarded thus possible interesting cases, where the
legislator can trade-off between corruption and illegal activity. Moreover, we have
assumed that the leniency rate and the design of the leniency program are the only
tools the legislator can manipulate to achieve his objective which is another limita-
tion to the model. Indeed, in practice, the legislator possesses a set of tools that he
can rely on such as the raising the probability of detecting the evidence or modify-
ing the fines imposed on the players. Allowing for these alternatives in a context
where the legislator has limited resources could lead to interesting results on the
substituability between these different enforcement tools.
Finally, this model could open ways to future research. For instance, future
research could consider the design of the optimal leniency program in different insti-
tutional settings. Examples include a "Pre-detection leniency" in which the leniency
is available only before the detection of the evidence of the illegal activity; two possi-
bilities might arise: the reduction of the fines for disclosing the illegal activity and/or
a reduction of fines for disclosing the corruption. Another instance is adopting a
setting of "simultaneous detection" where we the possibility of detecting evidence
of both illegal activity and corruption simultaneously instead of sequentially. More-
over, we could introduce a bargaining game to determine the level of bribe paid to
the public official.
Appendix 1.A On Assumption 1.1
In the baseline model, a criminal commits the illegal activity whenever his partici-
pation constraint, pic ≥ 0, is satisfied, i.e., when
pi − αF i + θ∗{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b} ≥ 0
that could be rewritten as:
(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b ≥ − 1
θ∗
[pi − αF i]
The RHS is negative for realizations of pi that are relatively high since θ∗ ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, the LHS can be negative or non negative. By assumption 1.1, we restrict
our attention to the cases where the bribe B is sufficiently small such that the LHS
is strictly higher than zero. However, for low realizations of pi, assumption 1.1 is
always satisfied since the RHS will be positive in such case.
Appendix 1.B Proofs
1.B.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
The first part of the proposition is straightforward from (1.1) and (1.3) as shown in
section 1.3.
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The second part of the proposition is derived from equations (1.2) and (1.4)
pi1c (q)− pic = (θ∗1 − θ∗){(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b}+ θ∗1α[β − (1− q)]F b
pi1c (q) > pic if:
(θ∗1 − θ∗){(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b}+ θ∗1α[β − (1− q)]F b > 0
θ∗1α[β − (1− q)]F b > (θ∗ − θ∗1){(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b}
q > q˜ = 1− β + (θ
∗ − θ∗1)
θ∗1αF b
{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b}
By (1.5) and (1.1);
(θ∗ − θ∗1)
θ∗1αF b
{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b} > 0
Thus, pi1c (q) > pic if q > q˜ > 1− β and pi1c (q) < pic if 1− β < q < q˜ 
1.B.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
The proposition is proven in two folds: First, we define the interval of leniency rates
over which θ∗2 < θ∗ and that over which θ∗2 > θ∗. Then, we determine the interval
where pi2c (q) exceeds pic.
From equations (1.6) and (1.1), we get:
θ∗2(q)− θ∗ = −α(1− β)w + α[β − (1− q
2
)]F b
∴ θ∗2(q) < θ∗ if:
α[β − (1− q
2
)]F b < α(1− β)w
which could be rewritten as:
q < q = 2(1− β)w + F
b
F b
Thus, for 1− β ≤ q < q, θ∗2 < θ∗ and for 1− β < q < q, θ∗2 > θ∗.
From equations (1.9) and (1.6), we can define the F.O.C.:
δ[pi2c (q)− pic]
δq
=
αF b
2
{(∆α)F i−B−[αβ+(1−α)β]F b+αβ+B−(1−α)β(F b+w)+w}−(αF b)2(1−q/2)
=
αF b
2
{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b + αβ +B − (1− α)β(F b + w) + w
− αβ(F b + w) + αβ(F b + w)} − (αF b)2(1− q
2
)
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=
αF b
2
{(∆α)F i−B−[αβ+(1−α)β]F b+αβ+θ∗+w+αβ(F b+w}−(αF b)2(1−q/2))
The S.O.C. of equation (1.9) is thus:
δ2(pi2c − pic)
δq2
=
(αF b)2
2
> 0
The next step is to determine whether the function pi2c (q) − pic is increasing or
decreasing over the interval [1− β, 1]:
at q = 1− β, we have:
δ[pi2c (q)− pic]
δq
=
αF b
2
{(∆α)F i−B−[αβ+(1−α)β]F b+αβ+θ∗+w+αβ(F b+w}−(αF b)2(1 + β
2
)
=
αF b
2
{(∆α)F i −B − [αβ + (1− α)β]F b + αβ + θ∗ + (1 + αβ)w − αF b
which is non negative for not too large values of F b. So, we can conclude that
pi2c (q)− pic is increasing over the concerned interval.
Then, we define the sign of pi2c (q)− pic over the interval [1− β, q]:
From equation (1.9), at q = 1− β, we get:
pi2c (q)−pic = (θ∗2(q)−θ∗){(∆α)F i−B−[αβ+(1−α)β]F b}+θ∗2(q)α[β−(1−
1− β
2
)]F b
∵ 1− β ≤ q < q, θ∗2 < θ∗, we can rewrite it as:
pi2c (q)−pic = −(θ∗−θ∗2(q)){(∆α)F i−B−[αβ+(1−α)β]F b}−θ∗2(q)α[
1− β
2
)]F b < 0
Thus, at q = 1− β, pi2c (q) < pic.
At q = q, θ∗ = θ∗2. Hence, we get,
pi2c (q)− pic = θ∗2(q)α(1− β)w > 0
Therefore, we can conclude that over the interval [1 − β, q], there exists a leniency
rate, q, above which the profitability of the illegal activity increases under a sym-
metric leniency program compared to the benchmark while it decreases otherwise.
Furthermore, since δ[pi
2
c (q)−pic]
δq
> 0, the profitability of the illegal activity under a
symmetric leniency program will exceed its profitability under no leniency for any
q > q.
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1.B.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
The legislator’s program is:
Min
q
{Pr(pisc(q) > 0) + Pr(θ < θ∗s)} where s = 1, 2
s.t. (1− β) ≤ q ≤ 1
Under an asymmetric leniency program:
From equation (1.4), the legislator’s objective function could be rewritten as:
Min
q
{Pr(pi > αF i − θ∗1{(∆α)F i −B − [α(1− q) + (1− α)β]F b}) + Pr(θ < θ∗1)}
From equation (1.3), θ∗1 is not a function of q. So, the legislator’s objective function
could be reduced to:
Min
q
{(∆α)F i −B − [α(1− q) + (1− α)β]F b}
s.t. (1− β) ≤ q ≤ 1
F.O.C.:αF b > 0
The solution to this problem will be thus a corner solution: q∗1 = 1− β.
We get the pi∗1c by substituting q∗1 in equation (1.4).
Under a symmetric leniency program:
From equations (1.6) and (1.7), the legislator’s objective function could be rewritten
as:
Min
q
{Pr(pi > αF i − θ∗2{(∆α)F i −B − [α(1− q) + (1− α)β]F b}) + Pr(θ < θ∗2)}
s.t. (1− β) ≤ q ≤ 1
which can be reduced to:
Min
q
θ∗2(q){(∆α)F i −B − [α(1− q
2
) + (1− α)β]F b}+ θ∗2(q))
s.t. (1− β) ≤ q ≤ 1
and θ∗2(q) = B − (1− α)β(F b + w)− α[(1− q
2
)F b + w]
F.O.C.:
α
1
2
F b{(∆α)F i−B−[α(1−q
2
)+(1−α)β]F b}+1}+α1
2
F b{B−(1−α)β(F b+w)−α[(1−q
2
)F b+w]]}
S.O.C.:
1
2
(αF b)2 > 0
∴ F.O.C. at q = 1− β:
α
1
2
F b{(∆α)F i−B− [αβ+ (1−α)β]F b +B− [(1−α)β+α](w+F b) + 1 +αF b} > 0
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The solution to this problem will be thus a corner solution: q∗2 = 1− β.
We get θ∗2 and pi∗2c by substituting q∗2 in (1.6) and (1.7) respectively.
The third part of the proposition consists of a comparison between θ∗2(q∗2) and
θ∗1, and between pi∗2c (q∗2) and pi∗2c (q∗1), at q∗1 = q∗2 = 1− β;
θ∗1 − θ∗2 = −α(1− β)
2
F b < 0
pi∗1c − pi∗2c = α(1− β)F b{
1
2
(∆)F i +
1
2
(
α(1− β)
2
)F b +
1
2
[α + (1− αβ)]w −B} ≥ 0

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Chapter 2
On Corporate Crime, Compliance
Programs and Corporate
Reputation1
2.1 Introduction
In 2015, the United States (US) Environmental Protection Agency has accused Volk-
swagen Group (VW), the German automaker, for installing a "defeat device" in VW
diesel-engine cars, which is known publicly as the "dieselgate". This device consists
of a software that aims at detecting the time when the emission performance of a
VW car is being tested by a regulatory authority, and intentionally reduce the car’s
CO2 emission, only during the test, in order to comply with the legal requirements.
The automaker has admitted that the software has been installed in 11 million cars
worldwide. As a result, the stock value of VW dropped by 22% in one day, and its
CEO resigned within few weeks following that scandal (Siano et al., 2017). In US
alone, this scandal has resulted in a financial loss of 20billion, including4.3 billion
of criminal and civil charges. Moreover, six VW executives, who are not member
of the management board, are facing criminal charges for their role in this violation
(Tabuchi et al., 2017). In Germany, VW is facing nearly 1600 lawsuits from investors
seeking compensation for the massive drop in VW shares following its admission of
the scandal (Reuters, 2018).
Interestingly, in VW’s sustainability reports for the period 2012-2014, the com-
pany highlighted its ambition to become a leader in environmental sustainability,
in particular in terms of CO2 emission reduction. Furthermore, it attempted to
integrate the commitment to environmental sustainability as part of the corporate
culture. For instance, VW employees were engaged in environmental protection
projects, workshops and training sessions were organized to ensure that the employ-
ees comply with the corporate objectives. Also, the external suppliers were subject
to strict requirements and constant monitoring to verify that they meet the envi-
ronmental sustainability standards set by VW (Siano et al., 2017).
1I am grateful to Maria Pia Sacco, Paulo Vanin, Philip Curry, Lucio Picci and the participants
of the PhD Seminar at the University of Bologna for their useful comments on earlier versions of
the model.
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The "dieselgate" provides a rich framework to analyze the different aspects of a
corporate crime. First, unlike an individual crime, a corporate crime is characterized
by its "agency" nature. That is, the crime is committed by a firm agent such as a
manager (as in the VW case), an employee, or an independent contractor. Also, the
crime consequences benefit not only the individual agent who committed the crime,
but the whole firm as well (Arlen, 1994). Examples of corporate crime include public
officials bribing, financial fraud, product misselling, tax avoidance, market collusion,
environmental rule infringement, and human right violation.
Even if the corporate crime is committed by an agent of the firm, the whole firm
as a legal entity can be subject to a corporate sanction. Indeed, holding the firm
liable for its agent’s misconduct is considered as a key element to deter a corporate
crime since the firm can undertake several measures to prevent its agent’s miscon-
duct, such as the managerial incentives, regular audit and monitoring..etc. Hence,
several jurisdictions have incorporated n their laws different scopes of corporate li-
ability. For instance, in some countries, such as in Sweden and Russian Federation,
the firm is subject to the corporate liability only if the crime was committed by a
top manager, while in other countries, such as US, Italy, Korea and Japan, the firm
is liable not only if the a top manager has committed the crime but also if he fails to
take adequate measures to prevent it (OECD, 2016). Jurisdictions might differ as
well in whether the liability should apply to only to the firm responsible of the crime
(as a legal entity), or also to all the firm individuals involved in the crime. The US
Antitrust Law is an example of former jurisdictions while the EU Competition Law
is an example of the latter (Angelucci and Han, 2010).
The legal sanctions are not the only penalty that a firm encounters for com-
mitting a corporate crime, the firm might be also subject to market penalties or
reputational loss, which can discourage the firm stakeholders to continue dealing
with the firm. The reputational loss often takes the form of a drop in the firm’s
share’s price, which differs based on the type of the crime committed. For instance,
a crime that affects the stakeholders of the firm such as fraud or product recall has
a remarkable impact on the firm’s value, as compared to crimes that affect third
parties as environmental violations (Karpoff et al., 2005).
In order to limit the harmful effects of corporate crimes, firms are encouraged
to adopt compliance programs. These programs consist of a set of measures that
vary between ex-ante measures (e.g., due diligence when hiring the agent, taking
preventive measures, training and educating the employees) and ex-post measures
(e.g., auditing and monitoring the agent, self-reporting and the cooperation with
the law enforcer) (OECD, 2009). Therefore, implementing a credible and effective
compliance program allows the firm to maintain a good reputation. Moreover, some
jurisdictions provide lenient treatment to the firm if an effective compliance pro-
gram was in place when the corporate crime has occurred, e.g. US, Canada and UK
(OECD, 2016). However, as in VW case, compliance programs are not always a sign
of commitment to deter corporate crime but they could serve as window-dressing
policies or greenwashing that aim to gain market legitimacy and to avoid the sanc-
tions by mimicking an effective compliance program (Krawiec, 2003).
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Using a game theoretical framework, we address the question of the credibility
of corporate compliance programs and the conditions under which it becomes a
"window-dressing" one. In particular, we emphasize the role of corporate reputation
in the design of compliance program and the managerial incentives and its impact
on the level of corporate crime.
We model the corporate crime as an agency problem between the firm (the
principal) and the manager (the agent)2. The firm hires a manager to perform
a task that provides her with a surplus in exchange of a payment contract. The
manager holds a private information on his ability to use an unlawful technology,
which improves his chances in completing the delegated task and hence improves
the principal’s chance to receive the surplus. Depending on this information and
the payment offered by the firm, the manager decides whether to exploit his ability
or not: Indeed, by raising the payment offered to the agent, the principal raises the
probability that an agent uses the unlawful technology. If the manager decides to
breach the law, a hard evidence is generated.
In this model, we will focus on the features of the compliance program that
could be applied ex-post, notably the monitoring. Therefore, the firm may collect
the misconduct’s evidence if a compliance program is implemented. The quality
of the compliance program depends on the amount invested in it: The higher the
amounts dedicated to the compliance program, the higher the likelihood of collecting
the evidence. Whenever the incriminating evidence is detected, the firm decides
whether to disclose it to the law enforcer or not. In case of disclosure, she and
the manager will be subject to corporate and individual sanctions. Otherwise, the
evidence can be found by the law enforcer and the firm will face a reputational loss
in addition to the legal sanction. In other words, by determining the firm’s ability to
find the evidence, the amount invested in compliance program affects the expected
corporate and individual sanctions and the probability that the firm will be subject
to a reputational loss.
The amount invested in the compliance program is optimally chosen by the firm:
She trades-off the higher cost of investment in compliance and the higher payments
offered to compensate the manager for the higher expected sanction with the lower
risk of loosing her reputation. Similarly, the optimal level of corporate crime re-
flects a trade-off between the higher expected surplus from one side with the higher
payment to the manager needed to encourage the corporate crime and the higher
expected corporate sanction from the other side.
The importance of the reputational loss, together with the profitability of the
task delegated to the agent determine the principal’s optimal investment in the com-
pliance program and the principal’s optimal level of corporate crime. We show that
reputational losses do not always completely deter the corporate crime. Moreover,
large investments in compliance are not necessarily associated with lower levels of
corporate crime and that modest investments in compliance (and sometimes the
absence of a compliance program at all!) are not necessarily a sign that the firm
promotes corporate crime. These results stem from the interplay between the in-
2Along the analysis, we refer to the firm/principal using the female form (she/her) and the
manager/agent by the male form (he/his).
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vestment in compliance program and the managerial incentives in equilibrium.
When the reputational loss is high and the task entails a large surplus, the firm
will engage in excessive monitoring allowing her to collect the incriminating evidence
and to disclose it more likely. Accordingly, the monitoring provides the firm with a
shield from the reputational loss alleviating thus the marginal cost of the crime. As
a result, the firm finds it profitable to increase the managerial incentives to boost
corporate crime and to enjoy the large surplus more likely. It is a case where the
compliance program is void: Its deterrent power is diluted by the higher incentives
making it a "window-dressing" program.
Interestingly, when the reputational loss is high but the surplus of the task is
low, the firm reduces or even stops the investments in compliance as a response to
higher levels of reputational loss. In that case, the returns from the crime are not too
high and they are associated with large expected sanction. The maximization of the
firm’s payoff requires limiting the level of corporate crime. Relying on monitoring
to control the corporate crime entails additional costs and is not rewarding enough
since the reputational loss becomes less threatening due to the low levels of corporate
crime. Hence, in this case, the firm prefers to rely solely on lower incentives to
achieve its objective. This is a case where the deterrence of corporate crime does
not depend on the compliance program.
Another instance where the firm does not implement a compliance program is
when the task surplus is high while the reputational loss is low. This situation
makes the corporate crime more appealing. The investment in compliance implies
a reduction of the power of the managerial incentives: By investing in compliance,
the principal increases the agent’s expected sanction. Hence, part of the managerial
incentive is used to compensate the agent for the expected sanction, making it costly
for the firm to provide incentive to use the unlawful technology. The principal ex-
ploits thus the low reputational loss: She mutes the compliance program to increase
the power of the managerial incentives, even though she will risk her reputation.
Finally, when the reputational loss is moderate and regardless of the profitabil-
ity of the task, the investment in compliance programs becomes necessary to avoid
the reputational loss. This investment makes the corporate crime less attractive:
Providing incentives to the agent to breach the law becomes costly since he needs
to be compensated for the higher expected sanction. Meanwhile, the investment in
compliance, and hence the probability of detecting the incriminating evidence, is
not high enough to guarantee a protection against the reputational loss. In that
case, higher levels of reputational loss lead to lower levels of corporate crime.
The main contribution of our work is the study of the corporate crime while
considering the firm’s reputational loss and endogeneizing both the managerial in-
centives and the investment in compliance program. To our knowledge, the closest
paper to our work is Angelucci and Han (2010). In this paper, they study the op-
timal leniency policy while considering the agency problem within the firm and the
possibility of implementing a compliance program, adding thus a new level to the
analysis of the design of leniency programs. The main result of the paper is that
the optimal leniency program is the corporate leniency program rather than the
individual one. The reason behind this is two folds. First, an individual leniency
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program will increase the manager’s incentives to commit the corporate crime by
reducing its expected cost. Second, offering a lenient sanction to the firm would
increase the incentives of a firm that adopted a compliance program to cooperate
with the law enforcer, which raises the expected cost of the crime to the manager.
Like Angelucci and Han (2010), we consider the design of the managerial incen-
tives and the compliance program. However, our work departs from Angelucci and
Han (2010) in several respects. First, we consider policy parameters different than
those studied in Angelucci and Han (2010). Precisely, we consider the reputational
loss which is a market penalty and can take any value instead of the leniency pro-
gram designed by the law enforcer. Second, a main difference is that we treat the
level of corporate crime and the investment in compliance program as continuous
variables instead of binary ones which provides more insights on the interaction be-
tween these two elements: We can detect not only whether the principal adopted a
compliance program or not, but we detect as well the effectiveness of the program.
Moreover, in our model the agent’s decision to commit the crime depends on his pri-
vate type. Therefore, the principal can design the contract in a way to allow some
types to breach the law while other types not to do so, which serves as a measure of
the level of the corporate crime. These two features enable us to relate between the
effectiveness of the compliance program and the level of corporate crime, which is
missed in Angelucci and Han (2010)’s model. Third, we adopt a positive approach
by studying the design of managerial incentives and the compliance program given
different levels of reputational loss, while Angelucci and Han (2010) adopt a norma-
tive one by considering the optimal design of the policy parameters.
Our work is related as well to the strand of literature on the design of managerial
incentives with harmful activities, (e.g. Aubert, 2009; Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009;
Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Different corporate crimes, such as market collusion,
financial fraud and misselling of products, have been considered in these studies.
Our main contribution to this strand is treating the monitoring of the agent’s mis-
conduct as an endogenous variable that affects both the principal and the agent’s
payoffs, while other models have considered the monitoring as an exogenous vari-
able that raises only the agent’s expected sanction. Endogenizing the monitoring
introduces new trade-offs to the study of the corporate crime. David Robison and
Santore (2011) have studied the role of monitoring and the reputational loss that
occurs upon the detection of the corporate crime. The reputational loss is thus sim-
ilar to the legal sanction in our model. However, the model did not address the idea
of the principal’s cooperation with the law enforcer. As a result, the monitoring in
David Robison and Santore (2011) plays a deterrent role by raising the manager’s
expected sanction from the crime and might exhibit a perverse effect as it makes the
reputational loss more likely to occur. Unlike our model, this model did not capture
the protective effect that the monitoring might play.
Finally, our model contributes to the monitoring literature (e.g. Arlen, 2012;
Oded, 2011). Particularly, we provide a theoretical framework for the instance of
adopting "window dressing" compliance programs. The question of these cosmetic
programs has arose in the law and economics literature (Krawiec, 2003; Oded, 2011)
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but no formal analysis on the firm’s incentives of adopting such programs was pro-
vided. Moreover, we add new aspects to the problem of choosing the monitoring
technology, such as the profitability of the agent’s task and the reputational loss.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The model set-up and
the timing are presented in Section 2.2. We derive the equilibrium under full in-
formation and costless monitoring in Section 2.3, while the analysis of the case of
non-observable ability of using the unlawful technology with costly monitoring is
reported to Section 2.4. The main results of our model regarding the impact of the
reputational loss on the equilibrium levels of monitoring and corporate crime are
in Section 2.5. We provide some policy implications in Section 2.6 and conclude in
Section 2.7.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Set-up
In order to assess the impact of corporate reputation on the optimal design of com-
pliance programs and the optimal level of corporate crime, we refer to a game the-
oretical model that consists of two risk neutral players: a Principal and an Agent.
The Agent, who could be an employee, an independent contractor or a man-
ager, decides whether to accept the task delegated by the principal or not3. He can
use either a lawful or an unlawful technology to perform the task. The technol-
ogy choice is not observable by the principal. The unlawful technology results in a
corporate crime such as bribing a public official, implementing risky environmental
projects or providing misleading information to customers.
If the agent proceeds lawfully, the task is accomplished with a baseline probability
p. If he decides to use the unlawful technology, a hard evidence is generated and
his ability to use this technology, θi, determines the probability of accomplishing
the task, p(θi) ∈]0; 1]. θi is private information, lies within [θ, θ¯] and is distributed
with cdf G(.) and pdf g(.). We assume that the higher the θi, the higher the agent’s
ability level of using the unlawful technology and subsequently, the more likely he
will perform the task. Moreover, we assume that the marginal increase of the prob-
ability of task completion does not depend on the agent’s type, i.e. ∂
2p
∂θ2i
(θi) = 0.
The unlawful technology is at least as efficient as the lawful one, i.e. p(θi) ≥ p, and
the least skillful agent achieves the task with the baseline probability: p(θ) = p4.
The Principal, e.g. a firm, hires the agent to perform a task. If the task is
3For sake of simplicity, we assume that the agent has a zero outside option. The impact of a
positive outside option on the results is discussed briefly in footnote 11.
4The model allows for the case where the unlawful technology is less efficient than the lawful
one if the agent’s ability to use it is sufficiently low, i.e. p(θi) < p if θi < θˇ. Considering this
case will result in shifting the lower bound of the potential criminal agents upward: The principal
can never provide enough incentives to let the types θi < θˇ engage in an unlawful activity The
qualitative results of the model will remain unaltered.
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accomplished, the principal receives a surplus Π. She offers a transfer to the agent
that will be indicated as the contract. The transfer consists of two components: a
non-contingent part t¯ that the agent receives regardless of his performance and a
contingent part, tc, that he gets upon the completion of the task. We assume that
the agent is subject to a limited liability constraint, implying that t¯ ≥ 0 and tc ≥ 0.
Furthermore, the principal designs a compliance program. The aim of the com-
pliance program is to detect the evidence of the agent’s misconduct by monitoring
the latter and conducting internal investigations. The principal’s investment in
monitoring determines the probability of finding hard evidence of the misconduct,
denoted by γ ∈ [0, 1], and costs C(γ). To ensure that the principal’s problem is
well-behaved, we assume that C(0) = 0, ∂C
∂γ
(0) = 0, ∂C
∂γ
> 0 and ∂2C
∂γ2
> 0. Upon the
detection of the evidence, the principal decides whether to disclose the evidence to
the law enforcer or not.
The institutional framework. A law enforcer launches an investigation to
detect corporate crime and finds the evidence with a probability α. Whenever the
misconduct is detected by the law enforcer, a strict liability regime applies5: A
corporate fine, F , and an individual fine, f , are imposed on the principal and the
agent respectively.
In addition to the legal sanctions, the principal faces a reputational loss, R, if
she does not deliver the evidence of the misconduct to the law enforcer before the
start of the investigations 6. Indeed, the principal will not deliver the evidence in
two circumstances: First, the principal finds the evidence of the misconduct but
chooses not to bring it to the law enforcer. Second, the principal was not able to
find the evidence.
In the analysis, we exclude the first reason by assuming that the reputational
loss is sufficiently high that the principal prefers to cooperate with the law enforcer
whenever the evidence is found7, which can be formulated as follows:
Assumption 2.1.
R ≥ 1− α
α
F
5The principal could be subject to other corporate liability regimes , e.g. a compound liability
regime (Oded, 2011) or a composite liability regime (Arlen, 2012), that are found to be socially
optimal with respect to the strict liability regime. We defer the discussion about these liability
regimes to section 2.6.
6In the period 2002-2006, whereas 40% to 60% of the enterprises sentenced under the US Federal
Guidelines have cooperated with the investigations, only 1% to 6% self-reported the corporate crime
(Mullin and Snyder, 2009). Our model could accommodate ex-post cooperation. In that case, we
would consider two different probabilities: α1 as the probability of launching investigation and α2
as the probability of finding the evidence by the law enforcer if the principal fails to report it.
Moreover, the principal’s decision to cooperate with the law enforcer will follow the launch of the
investigation instead of self-reporting. The qualitative results of the model will not change if we
consider this setting.
7The assumption on the principal’s honesty is plausible: Under some regulations, the principal
might face individual liability for failing to report the misconduct or might receive a bounty for his
cooperation (Arlen, 1994). Moreover, a principal might prefer to report a violation to avoid the
risk of higher corporate sanctions, if the violation is detected later (as under corporate leniency
programs) which might affect the firm’s value and future profits (Angelucci and Han, 2010).
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2.2.2 Payoffs
The Principal. The principal receives the surplus Π if the task is completed and
pays a transfer to the agent. The transfer consists of t¯ that is independent of the
agent’s performance and tc that is contingent on the completion of the task. The
principal invests in compliance program, C(γ), and with probability γ, finds the
evidence of misconduct that she reports to the law enforcer to pay a corporate
fine F . Otherwise, the law enforcer finds the evidence with probability α and the
principal faces the sanction F and the reputational loss R.
The principal’s expected payoff if the agent breaches the law is thus:
p(θi) (Π− tc)− t¯− C(γ)− [γ F + (1− γ) α (F +R)]
If the agent proceeds lawfully, the principal’s expected payoff would be:
p (Π− tc)− t¯− C(γ)
The Agent. The agent receives the transfer, and faces an individual sanction
f whenever the evidence is found. Therefore, the agent’s expected payoff, if he
breaches the law is:
t¯+ p(θi) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f
If he complies to the law, his payoff would be:
t¯+ p tc
2.2.3 Timing
The previous set-up has the following timing:
τ = 1 Knowing the surplus from the task, Π, the principal decides upon the
transfer, tc and t¯, and the probability of finding the evidence, γ.
τ = 2 The agent observes his type, θi, and decides whether to reject the task
and get the outside option, or to accept the task. If the task is accepted,
the agent determines whether to commit the corporate crime. The task
is achieved with probability p(θi) if he commits the crime, and with
probability p otherwise .
τ = 3 The principal monitors the agent and starts an internal investigation. If
a crime is committed, the evidence is found with probability γ.
τ = 4 If the principal finds the evidence of misconduct, she provides it to the
law enforcer. Otherwise, the evidence is found by the law enforcer with
probability α. In both cases, the sanctions F and f apply. In the latter
case, the principal faces a reputational loss R and the game ends.
We look for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium by solving the game by backward
induction.
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2.3 Observable Ability of Using Unlawful Technol-
ogy and Costless Monitoring: The Benchmark
In a full information context, the principal perfectly observes the agent’s ability to
use the unlawful technology, θi. Furthermore, she can detect the agent’s decision to
commit the corporate crime and the evidence of the misconduct without incurring
the costs of implementing a compliance program. These features of the full infor-
mation context allow the principal to design a contract that depends on both the
agent’s private type and on his decision to commit the crime.
Even though the corporate crime entails some benefits to the principal, those
benefits always come at a price. The unlawful technology can be perceived as a tool
enabling the agent to complete the task with higher probability which benefits the
principal. However, the unlawful technology is deemed not to be socially optimal,
which puts the principal and the agent at risk of facing corporate and individual
sanctions given the strict liability regime we are considering. Indeed, if a corporate
crime is committed, the sanctions will apply with certainty: The principal, who
perfectly observes the crime, collects the evidence costlessly and reports it to the
law enforcer to avoid the reputational loss by assumption 2.1.
As for the transfers, to ensure that the agent undertakes the task, the principal
has at least to compensate him for the costs related to it. In case the unlawful
technology is used, these costs are mainly the cost of committing the corporate crime
which is the individual sanction. Consequently, the principal finds it optimal to offer
the agent a non-contingent transfer that is equivalent to the individual sanction,
extracting thus the agent’s rent. Therefore, by pushing the agent to commit the
crime, the principal bears the costs of the corporate sanction and the payment
offered to the agent. As a result, she prefers the unlawful technology if the agent’s
ability to use it is sufficiently high such that the expected surplus emanating from
the task is large enough to incorporate these costs.
Accordingly, if the agent lacks the ability to manipulate the unlawful technology
in a way that generates an expected surplus that is sufficiently high, the principal
opts for the lawful technology, even if she obtains the surplus less likely: By pro-
ceeding lawfully, both the principal and the agent avoid legal sanctions. Moreover,
the principal pays the agent a non-contingent transfer that is equal to his outside
option, which is null in our model. Thanks to these lower costs, the lawful technol-
ogy becomes the principal’s best choice when the expected surplus is not sufficiently
large.
The following proposition states the condition under which the principal opts
for the unlawful technology and the optimal transfers offered to the agent when his
type is observable.
Proposition 2.1. If the agent’s ability to use the unlawful technology is observable:
The unlawful technology is adopted by the principal if the agent’s ability to use it
is sufficiently large: The expected surplus of the task should compensate the principal
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for the sanctions resulting from the corporate crime and should be at least as equal
as the expected surplus of adopting the lawful technology. This condition is satisfied
if:
p(θi) ≥ p(θ˜) = p+ F + f
Π
The optimal payment contract consists of a non-contingent transfer, t = t, such
that:
• If the unlawful technology is adopted (θi ≥ θ˜), t = f .
• If the lawful technology is adopted (θi < θ˜), t = 0.
The principal does not implement a compliance program.
Proof. See appendix 2.A 
2.4 Non-observable Ability of Using Unlawful Tech-
nology and Costly Monitoring
Once the agent decides to undertake the task, his strategy consists of a binary choice:
to use the unlawful technology or not. His decision depends on his ability to use the
unlawful technology and on the contract offered by the principal. In other words,
if the likelihood of completing the task and the transfer that the agent will receive
compensate him for the expected individual sanction and leave him with a payoff at
least as equal as the one he would have received by proceeding lawfully, the agent
breaches the law. The payment contract is thus "the carrot" through which the
principal affects the agent’s decision even if she does not observe his type.
Unlike the full information benchmark, the principal can manipulate the decision
of his agent through another tool; the "compliance program", which provides the
principal with a monitoring technology. It can be thus considered as a "stick". The
investment in compliance program determines the likelihood that the principal de-
tects the agent’s misconduct. This, in turn, defines the expected individual sanction
that the agent faces.
Besides the introduction of a compliance program, the private ability and costly
monitoring case departs from the benchmark in another aspect. The failure of the
principal to find an existing incriminating evidence exposes her to the loss of her
corporate reputation, R, if the law enforcer collects the evidence while investigating
the case. R can be considered as an additional sanction that the principal incurs
for failure to undertake his responsibility of ensuring the agent’s compliance. It is a
sanction imposed by the stakeholders.
As discussed in section 2.3, the agent’s decision affects the principal’s payoff in
two aspects. First, it determines the probability of achieving the task and receiving
the surplus. Second, if the agent breaches the law, the principal bears a corporate
sanction. Therefore, the principal would prefer the unlawful technology only if the
agent’s ability is sufficiently high in a way that compensates her for the corporate
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sanction and the cost of hiring the agent. Similarly, with private ability, the principal
designs her tools to induce an agent with sufficiently high ability to use the unlawful
technology and to deter an agent with low ability from doing so.
In formal terms, we define a marginal ability level, θ̂, at which the agent is
indifferent between using the unlawful technology and proceeding lawfully: If the
agent’s ability is higher than the marginal level, θ > θ̂, he uses the unlawful tech-
nology. Otherwise, the agent complies with the law. The principal gets the surplus
with an aggregate probability P (θ̂) = p
∫ θ̂
θ
g(θi)dθi +
∫ θ¯
θ̂
p(θi)g(θi)dθi and corporate
crime occurs with probability 1 − G(θ̂). In the following analysis, we will use the
symbol ∗ to represent the principal’s optimal value of the variables.
In an imperfect information setting, the marginal level of ability turns out to be
the key element in the principal’s payoff: It determines the aggregate probability of
completing the task, as well as the principal’s optimal level of corporate crime. Being
a benchmark that separates between the types that use the unlawful technology and
those who are deterred from doing so, the optimal marginal ability level determines
the probability that a corporate crime takes place within the firm, 1 − G(θ̂∗). By
properly designing her tools, the principal can affect the marginal ability level in a
way that maximizes her payoff.
The main purpose of the transfer, when the agent’s ability is not observable, is to
ensure that an agent with the marginal ability will receive the same expected payoff
either when he breaches the law or when he complies to it8. It is only by offering
a transfer that is contingent on the completion of the task that the principal can
reach this target: If the transfer has been independent of the agent’s performance,
he would have received it regardless of his decision to use the unlawful technology. It
wouldn’t have thus affected the agent’s strategy. But, the probability of completing
the task depends on the agent’s decision to commit the crime and on his ability to
manipulate the unlawful technology, which makes a contingent transfer an adequate
tool to ensure the marginal agent’s indifference regarding the use of the unlawful
technology.
The optimal transfer, t∗c9 is captured by the following equation:
t∗c = tc(θ̂
∗, γ∗) =
[γ∗ + (1− γ∗) α] f
p(θ̂∗)− p
(2.1)
It consists of the expected individual sanction discounted by the difference in the
probabilities of completing the task when the unlawful technology is used and when
it is not. It accounts thus for both the costs and benefits that a corporate crime
entails for an agent with the marginal ability level.
8As will be shown in Appendix 2.B, the principal’s problem is to determine the optimal transfer
and the optimal probability of detection. However, a one to one relationship exists between the
transfer and the marginal ability level. We can thus exploit this relationship and switch the
variables in the principal’s problem without affecting the main results of the model. Therefore,
by optimally choosing the marginal ability level of using the unlawful technology, the principal
chooses the optimal transfer and vice-versa.
9In this setting, the optimal contract cannot be designed to reveal the agent’s private type:
The agent’s decision that depends on his type is whether to use the unlawful technology. This
decision is not observable by the principal, making such contract impossible to be implemented.
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Importantly, the contingent transfer always leaves the agent with an information
rent, which ensures his participation to the task: The contingent transfer is a neces-
sary incentive to induce an agent with high ability to use the unlawful technology.
But, an agent who proceeds lawfully would receive it too. Lacking the tools to ex-
tract it, the principal would let this agent enjoy a positive rent. The same rent is
left to the marginal agent to satisfy the indifference condition. Typically, this rent
is ρ = p t∗c . Clearly, an agent with an ability level higher than the marginal one
enjoys larger rent and the rent increases with the ability level. Namely, an agent
with ability level θi receives ρi = ρ + [p(θi)− p(θ̂∗)] t∗.
The principal cannot only affect the agent’s gain from a corporate crime. She can
also control the cost that he incurs from committing it. The compliance program
can be viewed as a tool that affects directly the agent’s expected sanction. Once
the incriminating evidence is found by the principal, which occurs with probability
γ, the agent will face the individual sanction with certainty. Otherwise, the agent’s
sanction will depend on the law enforcer’s ability to collect the evidence.
Together with the transfer, the compliance program is used by the principal to
satisfy the marginal agent’s indifference between breaching the law and complying
to it. Particularly, for a given ability level, as the probability of finding the evidence
increases, so does the transfer offered to the agent in order to compensate him for the
expected loss. That way the marginal agent will remain indifferent between the two
available options. The stick and the carrot can be perceived thus as complements.
Furthermore, the increase in the contingent transfer that follows a marginal increase
in the probability of finding the evidence does not apply only to the marginal agent,
but to any agent provided that he completes the task.
In addition to its impact on the agent’s payoff, the investment in compliance has
direct effects on the principal’s payoff. Indeed, a better detection of the agent’s mis-
conduct affects the principal in two respects. First, it requires higher investments
in compliance, which is translated into an increase in the cost of monitoring, C(γ).
Second, a higher probability of finding the evidence implies that the principal would
cooperate with the law enforcer more likely, if a corporate crime occurs. By coop-
erating, the principal faces a reduced sanction: She would bear only the corporate
sanction, F , and avoid the reputational loss, R, that would have taken place if she
had failed to disclose the evidence.
The optimal probability of finding the evidence, γ∗, is determined by the follow-
ing F.O.C.:
l(θ̂∗, γ∗) = [1−G(θ̂∗)] [α (F +R)− F ]− ∂C
∂γ
(γ∗)− P (θ̂∗) ∂tc
∂γ
(θ̂∗) = 0 (2.2)
The optimal probability of finding the evidence reflects a trade-off: There is the
marginal gain that the principal gets by disclosing the evidence and saving her rep-
utation if the agent breaches the law (1st term in 2.2). Also, the higher cost of
monitoring and the cost of the higher transfer required to compensate the marginal
agent (2nd and 3rd terms in 2.2).
The optimal choice of the payment and the probability of detecting the mis-
conduct affects the optimal marginal ability level and thus the principal’s optimal
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level of corporate crime10 . The corporate crime benefits the principal: The more
important the level of corporate crime, the more likely the principal would receive
the surplus. Indeed, allowing an additional type to use the unlawful technology
implies that the task will be completed with probability p(θi) instead of the baseline
probability p. The result for the principal would be a higher aggregate probability
of receiving the surplus, P (θ̂). Yet, the principal’s reward gets smaller the higher
the level of corporate crime: The ability of the additional agent to use the unlawful
technology decreases and so does the probability of completing the task p(θi).
Just as important are the downsides of the corporate crime. Each additional
type that uses the unlawful technology increases the probability that the principal
faces an expected sanction: F at best and F + R at worst. The higher expected
sanction is one of the costs that the principal has to set against the higher expected
surplus that she gets by raising the corporate crime level. The other cost consists of
the higher transfer to be offered to the agent: Increasing the level of corporate crime
requires decreasing the marginal level of ability. The principal should thus provide
higher transfer to keep the marginal agent, who receives the transfer less likely then,
indifferent regarding the use of the unlawful technology. So, the principal’s optimal
level of corporate crime, θ̂∗ is represented by the following FOC:
h(θ̂∗, γ∗) =
∂P
∂θi
(θ̂∗)[Π−t(θ̂∗, γ∗)]−P (θ̂∗)∂tc
∂θi
(θ̂∗, γ∗)+
∂G
∂θi
{γ∗F+(1−γ∗)α(F+R)} = 0
(2.3)
The optimal level trades-off the higher expected surplus (1st term in 2.3) with the the
higher transfer and higher expected sanction (2nd and 3rd terms in 2.3, respectively) .
The following proposition summarizes the trade-offs determining the principal’s
optimal marginal ability level as well as the optimal probability of finding the evi-
dence and the optimal transfer.
Proposition 2.2. If the agent’s ability to use the unlawful technology is non-observable,
there exists an equilibrium such that:
The level of corporate crime, 1 − G(θ̂∗) that maximizes the principal’s payoff,
balances the benefits of a marginal decrease in the agent’s ability and the costs the
principal incurs for doing so.
The principal’s optimal probability of finding the evidence, γ∗, trades-off the ben-
efit of saving the corporate reputation, the direct cost of monitoring and the cost of
increasing the agent’s transfer.
The optimal payment takes into account the marginal agent’s expected individual
sanction and the higher expected transfer. It consists of a contingent transfer, t∗c11.
10As noted in footnote 8, the choice of the optimal marginal ability level will lead to the
optimal choice of the transfer offered to the agent due to the one to one relationship between the
two variables that is described through equation 2.1.
11If we allow for a positive outside option and if Π is sufficiently small, the optimal transfer will
consist of non-contingent and contingent payments. This type of contract allows the principal to
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A positive rent is left to the agent.
Proof. See appendix 2.B. 
2.5 Reputational Loss, Compliance Program and
Corporate Crime
This section assesses the impact of reputational loss on the principal’s incentives
to invest in compliance program and on the principal’s optimal level of corporate
crime. Unlike the corporate sanction that applies whenever the crime is detected, the
particularity of the reputational loss is that it is triggered by the principal’s failure
to disclose the incriminating evidence to the law enforcer. Therefore, its impact
on the principal’s choice variables is distinct from that of the legal sanctions. The
following analysis will emphasize two cases: The case of tasks with low profitability
and that with high profitability.
The surplus that the principal receives upon the completion of the task is one of
the determinants of the level of corporate crime. An increase in the surplus implies
that the task becomes more beneficial, and subsequently, the benefit of encourag-
ing an agent with lower ability level to use the unlawful technology becomes more
important (1st term in 2.3). Accordingly, higher surplus results in higher levels of
corporate crime and vice versa. The surplus does not affect the equilibrium level of
monitoring directly, it affects it indirectly through the level of corporate crime.
The increase of the reputational loss entails a direct effect on the equilibrium
levels of monitoring and corporate crime within the firm. Indeed, a higher reputa-
tional loss tends to increase the marginal benefit of monitoring: A more effective
compliance program would enable the principal to find the evidence of the mis-
conduct more likely, to cooperate and to acquire a protection against this higher
sanction. Moreover, this higher penalty implies that a higher level of crime becomes
more costly: The firm bears a higher expected sanction if a crime is committed.
This direct effect suggests, thus, that an increase in the reputational loss is asso-
ciated with a more effective compliance program and a lower level of corporate crime.
Nevertheless, this direct effect is not the only relevant factor. The increase of
reputational loss affects the level of monitoring and the level of corporate crime
indirectly through the feedback effects between the two variables, which might
strengthen or weaken the direct effect depending on the values of the parameters as
we will show in the following.
extract the agent’s rent. The contingent payment ensures that the agent with the marginal ability
level is indifferent between breaching the law and complying to it. The non-contingent payment
extracts the expected bonus. This type of contract is viable only if the agent’s outside option
is positive and the bonus (and subsequently the level of crime) is not too large. Otherwise, the
non-contingent payment will be negative, violating thus the limited liability constraint. Note that
even though the restriction we impose on the outside option eliminate this type of contract in
equilibrium, it does not alter the qualitative results of the model.
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2.5.1 Tasks with low profitability
When the profitability of the delegated task is low, following an increase in the repu-
tational loss, the principal chooses a higher level of monitoring in order to attenuate
the risk of facing the higher sanction as suggested by the direct effect discussed
above. By investing more in monitoring, the corporate crime becomes less attrac-
tive. Higher monitoring implies a higher probability of unveiling the incriminating
evidence, which increases the expected sanction of the agent. The principal should
thus provide a higher transfer, tc, to the agent, which reduces the expected net
surplus the principal gets from a higher level of corporate crime (1st term in 2.3).
Moreover, it becomes more costly to incentivize the agent with lower ability level
to breach the law since he will face a higher expected sanction and he will receive
the transfer less likely (2nd term in 2.3). This increase in the marginal cost of the
corporate crime that follows an increase in monitoring pushes the principal to re-
duce the transfer offered to the agent and thus the probability of using the unlawful
technology. This indirect effect reinforces the direct effect of reputational loss on
the level of corporate crime: The equilibrium level of corporate crime decreases with
the reputational loss.
Note that the transfer is not the only channel through which the monitoring
can affect the level of crime, the expected sanction is another one. An increase
in probability of detection of the evidence means that the principal would face a
reduced sanction more likely (3rd term in 2.3), which reduces the marginal cost of
crime and might push towards higher levels of it. When the reputational loss is not
too high (i.e. the reduction in the sanction is small), the increase in the marginal
cost through the transfer’s channel dominates the reduction in the marginal cost
of crime through expected sanction: The net impact of higher monitoring is lower
levels of crime. Nevertheless, the impact of monitoring on the marginal cost of
crime through the channel of expected sanction becomes more prevalent with the
increase of the reputational loss12. Yet, even if this latter effect is dominant, the
deterrent effect of the reputational loss (the direct effect) dominates the reduction
of the crime’s marginal cost induced by higher monitoring. This occurs when the
level of monitoring is not too high: The principal ends up with lower probability of
corporate crime.
As the reputational harm becomes more salient, the level of corporate crime
in equilibrium becomes very low13 and so does the marginal benefit of monitoring
(1st term in 2.2): The reputational loss is perceived as less threatening since it is
less likely that a corporate crime occurs. The principal prefers thus to save on the
costs of monitoring and reduces the investment in compliance. This is a situation
where the indirect effect of reputational loss on monitoring dominates its direct ef-
12Formally, the dominance of the effect of monitoring on corporate crime through the expected
sanction occurs if ∂h∂γ =
∂l
∂θ < 0. This condition is satisfied if:
R > R˜ = 1α {(1− α)F − 1∂G
∂θ
[∂P∂θ (θ̂
∗) ∗ ∂t∂γ (θ̂∗) + P (θ̂∗) ∂
2t
∂θ∂γ (θ̂
∗)]}.
13Note that the initial level of corporate crime is already not too high since the profitability of
the task is low in this case.
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fect leading to a decrease in the probability of detecting the evidence of misconduct.
This trend continues as long as the reputational loss increases till a point where the
principal finds it optimal not to implement a compliance program (γ∗ = 0). Absent
a compliance program and given the large reputational loss and the low surplus
from the task, the principal optimally provides low incentives to the agent to deter
the corporate crime. Otherwise, the principal will risk facing the large reputational
harm.
In a nutshell, when the surplus from the task is small, deterring the corporate
crime is the principal’s response to an increase of the reputational loss: The princi-
pal relies on a harsher stick and less carrots to achieve his preferred outcome when
the reputational loss is small. As the reputational loss increases, the principal gets
rid of the stick but still provides less carrots to the agent.
The previous analysis is summarized in the following proposition14:
Proposition 2.3. If the surplus of the task is sufficiently low, higher levels of rep-
utational loss,R, are associated with lower levels of corporate crime, 1 − G(θ̂∗) .
Moreover, the probability of finding the evidence, γ∗, is non-monotonic in R. There
is a level of reputational loss, RL such that:
• for R ≤ RL, γ∗is increasing with R
• for R > RL, γ∗ is decreasing with R
Proof. See Appendix 2.C 
2.5.2 Tasks with high profitability
When the task provides the principal with large surplus, different trade-offs come
into effect to determine the impact of reputational loss on the principal’s optimal
level of monitoring and optimal level of corporate crime.
If the surplus is large enough and the reputational loss is low, a high level of cor-
porate crime seems to be a natural choice for a principal who maximizes his payoff: If
the agent uses the unlawful technology more likely, the principal will enjoy the high
surplus while facing a low expected sanction. As a result, the principal prefers to set
the monitoring to low levels. A lower investment in compliance would enable her to
reduce the expected individual sanction and thus the cost of the incentives she needs
to provide to the agent to induce higher levels of crime. Indeed, the principal might
give up the investment in a compliance program: When the reputational loss is ex-
tremely low and the probability of committing a crime is high, the marginal increase
in the transfer required by the principal to implement a more effective compliance
program (3rd term in 2.2) exceeds the higher marginal benefit that she might gain
by doing so (1st term in 2.2). In that case, the principal optimally chooses not to
14See Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 for a graphical representation of the result of Proposition 2.3.
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implement a compliance program15, and she will be constrained to choose the level
of corporate crime that satisfies equation 2.2 at γ∗ = 0. The increase of the rep-
utational loss relaxes this constraint, allowing the principal to choose higher levels
of crime16. In short, a principal who expects large returns from the delegated task
and will not be exposed to large reputational loss, will mute her compliance program
and provide high transfer to her agent as an incentive to use the unlawful technology.
As the reputational loss grows, and given the high probability of committing
the corporate crime, the marginal benefit of monitoring starts to play a role in the
principal’s optimal choice. For intermediate levels of reputational loss, the principal
starts to invest in compliance program, raising thus the probability of detecting the
incriminating evidence. As discussed in the subsection 2.5.1, the improvement in
the effectiveness of the compliance program affects the principal’s decision regarding
the level of corporate crime in two respects.
First, the higher risk that an agent will face an individual sanction implies that
a higher compensation needs to be provided to the agent for a given level of crime
and that the incremental transfer necessary to convince an agent with lower ability
to commit the crime becomes more important. As a result, this will discourage the
principal from seeking a higher level of corporate crime, strengthening the direct
effect of reputational loss on the level of corporate crime.
Second, an increase in the probability of finding the hard evidence of the miscon-
duct, enhances the principal’s chance to cooperate with the law enforcer by disclosing
it, which reduces her exposure to the reputational loss. Clearly, this "protective ef-
fect" of monitoring reduces the marginal cost of the crime, providing incentive to the
principal to boost the level of corporate crime by providing higher transfers to the
agent. In such case, the monitoring counteracts the direct effect of the reputational
loss on the level of corporate crime, particularly when the probability of detection
is high.
Which effect dominates depends on the intensity of the reputational loss: On
the one hand, if the reputational loss is moderate, the effect of monitoring on the
transfers is the dominant one. As a result, the deterrent effect of reputational loss
prevails: The principal provides lower incentives and increases the monitoring as
the reputational loss increases, leading thus to lower levels of corporate crime. It is
worthy to note that even if the level of corporate crime declines with the reputational
loss, it will remain high enough to make it beneficial for the principal to always invest
in monitoring. This is one of the differences between the tasks with high and low
profitability.
On the other hand, if the reputational loss is sufficiently high, the protective effect
of monitoring dominates its effect on the transfers. The reputational loss backfires,
15Particularly, in that case, the equilibrium is to invest negative amounts in compliance, which
is not possible given the non-negativity constraint on C(γ). Therefore, the principal relies on a
corner solution according to which the investment in compliance is null.
16When R < R˜, then we have ∂l∂θ > 0 (c.f., footnote 12), i.e. the positive impact of higher θ
on l through the marginal cost of monitoring dominates its negative impact through the marginal
benefit. This implies that, when γ = 0, an increase in θ∗ would be necessary to satisfy equation
2.2.
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and will result into higher levels of corporate crime coupled with higher investments
in monitoring. The compliance program turns to be a "window-dressing" program
(Oded, 2011; Krawiec, 2003) that the principal uses as a proof of her commitment in
controlling her agent to avoid the reputational loss, while she undermines this control
through the incentives she provides to her agent. We have provided thus a theo-
retical framework for Wils (2013)’s argument that the application of a compliance
program is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to have a real compliance.
The excessive investment in monitoring dilutes thus the deterrent effect of the rep-
utational loss.
The following proposition summarizes these observations17:
Proposition 2.4. If the surplus of the task is sufficiently high, the probability of
finding the evidence, γ∗, is always increasing with the reputational loss R. Further-
more, the level of corporate crime, 1 − G(θ̂∗), is non-monotonic in R. There exist
levels of reputational loss RH1 and RH2 such that
• for R < RH1, 1−G(θ̂∗) is increasing with R
• for RH1 ≤ R < RH2, 1−G(θ̂∗) is decreasing with R
• for R ≥ RH2, 1−G(θ̂∗) is increasing with R
Proof. See appendix 2.C 
2.6 Policy Implications and Discussion
This section sheds light on some policy implications that could be derived from our
model. Specifically, we will consider the impact of the reputational loss on the design
of the optimal fine and on the desirability of liability regimes other than the strict
liability one. We will discuss as well the compliance program-based leniency set by
the US Sentencing Guidelines.
2.6.1 Optimal fine
The main purpose of the corporate fine is to incorporate the social harm resulting
from the corporate crime into the firm’s payoff. This allows the firm to adequately
design the incentives provided to the manager and her policing tools to reach the
socially optimal level of corporate crime (Arlen, 2012).
Garoupa (2000) suggests that the optimal fine should be adjusted downward to
account for the non-legal sanctions that the firm might face. Otherwise, the corpo-
rate sanction might lead to overdeterrence. This result applies if we consider a case
where the reputational loss is triggered whenever the crime is detected regardless
of the firm’s cooperation with the law enforcer and if the firm relies solely on the
monetary incentives. However, if the severity of the reputational loss depends on
the firm’s cooperation with the law enforcer, our model suggests that the direction
17See Figures 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 for a graphical representation of the result of Proposition 2.4.
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of the adjustment of the optimal corporate fine depends on the importance of the
reputational loss. Indeed, the interplay between the design of compliance and the
design of the transfers offered to the manager depends on the level of reputational
harm, and it might lead to either overdeterrence or underdeterrence of the corpo-
rate crime. Accordingly, the optimal fine should be adjusted downward or upward
depending on the case.
2.6.2 Liability regimes
In our model, the firm is subject to a strict liability regime: The firm is deemed
liable for its agent misconduct regardless of the compliance measures it has under-
taken. However, the optimality of this regime has been questioned by the law and
economics literature (e.g. Arlen, 2012; Oded, 2011): If we set aside the reputational
loss, the strict liability regime does not provide proper incentives to the firm neither
to monitor nor to report her agents’ misconduct to the law enforcer. Moreover, it
entails a perverse effect on monitoring (Arlen, 1994), since a firm that detects the
misconduct’s evidence increases her likelihood of being liable. This perverse effect
of monitoring leads to suboptimal levels of deterrence.
Therefore, other liability regimes that might be optimally superior have been
suggested, e.g. a composite corporate liability regime (Arlen, 2012) and the com-
pound corporate liability regime (Oded, 2011). The main idea of these regimes is
that the firm should face a base sanction whenever the crime is committed and an
additional sanction for failing to fulfill each of its policing duties, such as preven-
tion, deterrence, self-reporting and cooperation with law enforcer, which provides
the firm with incentives to invest in costly policing measures. Nevertheless, the
main difference between the composite and the compound liability regimes remains
in the condition under which the firm would be subject to the additional sanction.
Whereas under a composite liability regime, there exists a due care level set by the
law enforcer such that if it is reached by the firm, she avoids the additional sanction,
under the compound liability regime, the additional sanction is avoided in case of
self-reporting: Once the firm reports the misconduct, she receives a discount in the
sanction equivalent to the variable costs of enforcement that the law enforcer would
have bore to collect the evidence by himself (Oded, 2011). Yet, these studies on the
optimality of the corporate liability regimes did not consider the reputational loss
that the firm might encounter.
Introducing these liability regimes to our model would affect the optimal level of
crime and the optimal probability of detection in a way that is worthy to note18. Par-
ticularly, the additional sanction suggested by these regimes might entail a perverse
effect on the level of corporate crime. We might thus observe, under the compound
or the composite liability regimes, levels of corporate crime that are higher than
those observed under the strict liability regime for a given level of reputational loss.
This is the case when the profitability of the task, Π, and the reputational loss, R,
18In Appendix 2.D.2, we provide a numerical example and a graphical representation illustrating
this point. See Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15 as an example of the case of tasks with low profitability
and Figure 2.16 and Figure 2.17 as an illustration of the case of tasks with high profitability.
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are sufficiently large.
To illustrate this, we will focus on the self-reporting as one of the policing duties
of the firm. The following analysis would apply thus to a composite liability regime
if we disregard the other policing duties and to a compound liability regime. Let
us consider the additional sanction that the firm faces if she fails to self-report the
agent’s misconduct to the law enforcer and denote it by S. The impact of this
additional sanction on the principal’s payoff is mainly an increase of the expected
corporate sanction, that becomes [1−G(θ̂)]{γ∗ F + (1− γ∗)α (F + S +R)} instead
of [1−G(θ̂)]{γ∗ F + (1− γ∗) α (F +R)}. The additional sanction S would operate
thus as an increase of R by the amount S. Let us restrict our attention to the case
of tasks with high profitability as it leads to the most striking results regarding the
impact of this additional sanction on the level of corporate crime19.
The introduction of the additional sanction, S, raises the sanction that the prin-
cipal will face if she fails to disclose the evidence of the misconduct to the law
enforcer. Consequently, to avoid the additional sanction, the principal invests more
in compliance program compared to a strict liability regime. This leads to a higher
probability of detecting the misconduct’s evidence for a given level of reputational
loss. When the reputational loss is not too large, the higher probability of detection
implies that a higher transfer is required to compensate the marginal agent for the
higher expected individual sanction, and that the incremental transfer necessary to
incentivize an agent with a lower ability level to use the unlawful technology should
increase as well, raising thus the marginal cost of the corporate crime. This increase
in the transfers coupled with the higher expected corporate sanction would push
the principal to reduce the transfers offered to the agent leading to lower levels of
corporate crime compared to a strict liability regime. Under these circumstances,
the additional sanction imposed in line with a compound or a composite liability
regimes exhibits a desired deterrent effect.
However, if the firm’s reputational loss will be severe, and under a strict liability
regime20, the high profitability of the task would encourage the firm to engage
in costly excessive monitoring. This excessive investment in compliance program
provides the firm with a "protective effect", since the firm will cooperate with the
law enforcer and avoids thus the reputational loss, R, more likely. The introduction
of the additional sanction, S, raises the firm’s incentives to invest in compliance
program which fosters this "protective effect", for a given level of R. More precisely,
the higher probability of detection that results from the introduction of S when
R is sufficiently large, reduces the marginal cost of raising the level of corporate
crime: The higher probability of detection implies that the principal will disclose
the misconduct’s evidence more likely. Consequently, it is more likely that she bears
only the initial legal sanction, F , and avoids both the reputational loss, R, and the
additional sanction, S, that she would have incurred if she did not cooperate with
the law enforcer. This reduction of the marginal cost of the crime would dominate
19In case of tasks with low profitability, the additional sanction, S, has a deterrent effect: It
leads to lower level of corporate crime for a given level of R. See Figure 2.14 for a graphical
illustration of that case.
20See section 2.5.2, for a detailed description of that case.
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the higher marginal cost of increasing the transfers as well as the direct effect of the
increase of the corporate expected sanction that follows the introduction of S. As a
result, when R is sufficiently large, the additional sanction, S, will lead to a higher
level of corporate crime compared to a strict liability regime where this additional
sanction is absent.
Finally, as mentioned above, the additional sanction, S, would operate as an in-
crease in the reputational loss of the principal. It would accelerate thus the perverse
effect the reputational loss has on the level of corporate crime when the profitabil-
ity of the task is large. Therefore, in some cases, this additional sanction might
undermine the deterrent effect of R that we observe under a strict liability regime,
particularly when R has intermediate values. Specifically, for intermediate values of
R (R ≤ RH2), under a strict liability regime an increase of the reputational loss is
associated with higher investment in compliance and lower levels of corporate crime.
Yet, for the same values of R, the application of a composite or a compound liabil-
ity regime results in a "window dressing" compliance program: An increase of R is
associated to a higher investment in compliance and higher levels of corporate crime.
Accordingly, the additional sanction suggested by Arlen (2012) and Oded (2011)
in the frame of the composite and the compound corporate liability regimes needs
to be designed with caution when the reputational loss comes into play. While these
regimes aim initially to incentivize the firm to monitor the agent and to report his
misconduct to avoid the underdetrrence that occurs under a strict liability regime,
the high levels of monitoring might end up supporting higher levels of corporate
crime and undermining the deterrent effect of the reputational loss.
2.6.3 Compliance program-based leniency
Another question that is raised in the literature is whether the rule set by the US
Sentencing Guidelines to provide a reduction of the corporate fine for implementing
a "well-designed" compliance program is desirable (Krawiec, 2003; Angelucci and
Han, 2010). With slight modifications, our model could provide us with the tools
to evaluate the impact of such regime on the level of corporate crime.
Let’s define C(γ¯) as the level of investment in compliance above which the pro-
gram is considered as "well-designed" by the law enforcer. Let’s assume, as well,
that the reputational loss, R, takes place only if the crime is detected by the law
enforcer and the principal did not meet the benchmark C(γ¯). We can interpret
here the R as the fine reduction we are interested in21. In that case, the firm will
not have incentive to cooperate, since the fine reduction the firm gets depends on
meeting the benchmark set by the law enforcer rather than on the disclosure of the
incriminating evidence. Consequently, the individual sanction will depend only on
the probability that the law enforcer collects the evidence, α, rather than on the
probability of detection determined by the firm’s investment in compliance program
21By the same token and for sake of comparison, the strict liability regime considered in the
previous analysis can be reinterpreted as liability regime where the firm gets a reduction for the
cooperation with the law enforcer.
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and so does the transfer paid to the agent. Moreover, the firm’s decision to invest
in compliance will not affect its expected sanction. Therefore, if the firm chooses a
level of monitoring γ < γ¯, it will be optimal to set it equal to 0 since the monitoring
entails only a direct cost and does not lead to any benefit for the firm. Note that
a firm will never find it optimal to choose a monitoring level above γ¯. The firm
will choose γ¯ if the gain from avoiding the reputational loss, R, exceeds the cost
of higher monitoring which is realized if R exceeds certain threshold that we can
denote by R¯ 22.
If R < R¯, the firm’s optimal level of corporate crime will be determined by
substituting γ∗ = 0 in equation 2.3. If the profitability of the task is low, this
new liability rule leads to higher levels of corporate crime compared to a liability
regime where the fine reduction is based on firm’s cooperation: The absence of a
compliance program reduces the marginal cost of corporate crime by reducing the
cost of the transfers needed to encourage the agent to use the unlawful technology.
Moreover, if the task is of high profitability, this liability rule will lead to higher
levels of corporate crime as well, notably when R < R¯ < RH223: The higher risk of
exposure to the reputational loss is dominated by the savings in the cost of transfers.
However, if RH2 < R < R¯, the absence of compliance program will deprive the firm
of the protective effect of monitoring, pushing thus to levels of corporate crime
lower than those under a liability regime where fine reduction depends on the firm’s
cooperation with the law enforcer.
If R ≥ R¯, the firm invests C(γ¯) in compliance program. Its optimal level of
corporate crime is defined through equation 2.3 if we substitute γ∗ and R by 0 to
capture the features of the new liability regime: The detection of the crime does
not depend on the firm’s ability to find the evidence and the firm avoids the repu-
tational loss by implementing a "well-designed" compliance program. Accordingly,
the optimal level of corporate crime is independent of R, and it is higher than that
under the other liability regime: For the principal, the marginal cost of crime is
lower due to the absence of the reputational loss and the lower incentives needed to
encourage the agent to violate the law.
In sum, except for the particular case of highly profitable tasks with RH2 <
R < R¯, assigning a fine reduction that is based on the implementation of a "well-
designed" compliance program rather than on the cooperation of the firm under-
mines the deterrent power of compliance programs. This finding is consistent with
Angelucci and Han (2010) who find that offering a lenient sanction based on the
existence of a compliance program is not optimal since it reduces the individual
sanction making thus the violation of the law less costly for the agent.
2.7 Conclusion
We have presented a formal model of corporate crime. We have studied the impact
of reputational loss on the level of corporate crime while considering the agency
22Formally, this condition is satisfied if R ≥ R¯ = C(γ¯)
G(θ̂) α
.
23c.f. proposition 2.4
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problem within the firm and the firm’s decision to invest in compliance program.
We focused on a case where the firm suffers from the reputational loss only if she
fails to deliver the incriminating evidence to the law enforcer. Although this may
seem unrealistic as reputational loss usually occurs whenever the crime is detected,
this assumption can be considered as a simplification of the case where the intensity
of the reputational loss depends on the quality of governance within the firm (De-
sai and Dharmapala, 2009). In this context, the reputational loss can be perceived
as the market penalty to the firm for failing to fulfill her role in controlling her agent.
We can draw several conclusions from the model. The most striking one is that
the reputational loss does not always exhibit a deterrent effect on the corporate
crime as expected. A perverse effect of reputational loss occurs when both the
reputational loss and the principal’s gain from the task delegated to the agent,
hence his gain from the corporate crime, are high. In that case, the principal engages
in excessive monitoring which allows her to collect the misconduct’s evidence and
disclose it to the law enforcer more likely, increasing thus her chances of avoiding
the reputational loss. Simultaneously, she provides the agent with high-powered
incentives to encourage an agent with low ability of using the unlawful technology to
breach the law by compensating him for the individual sanction he might encounter.
A severe reputational loss promotes thus the implementation of "window-dressing"
compliance programs that aim to protect the principal against the reputational loss
but do not lead to real compliance.
Moreover, we identify cases where not implementing a compliance program is an
optimal choice for the firm. Particularly, if the reputational loss is large while the
profitability of the task is low, the principal will face a significant loss by encouraging
the violation of law. The investment in monitoring will constitute, as well, a burden
on the principal’s payoff. The principal relies thus only on low-powered incentives
to deter the agent from committing the crime. Another instance where the principal
prefers to mute the compliance program is when the reputational loss is low while
the task is highly profitable. In that case, the principal optimally chooses to risk
her reputation in order to increase the power of the incentives provided to the agent
and thus to increase the probability that he uses the unalwful technology.
At last, the compliance program will ensure "real compliance" when either the
profitability of the task is large and the reputational loss is of intermediate levels,
or the task has a low profitability while the reputational loss is not too large. In
that case, following an increase in the reputational loss, investment in compliance
program becomes necessary to alleviate the principal’s expected sanction but the
probability of detection that results is not high enough to trigger a protective effect
against the reputational loss. As a consequence, the principal optimally reduces the
incentives provided to the agent and hence the likelihood of corporate crime.
Furthermore, some policy implications were driven from our model. In partic-
ular, we have highlighted how the reputational loss might affect the effectiveness
of some enforcement tools whose primary aim is to curb the corporate crime. For
instance, the ambiguous effect the reputational loss has on the level of corporate
crime needs to be reflected in the design of the optimal fine: An optimal fine should
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account for the principal’s gain from the corporate crime and for the level of the
reputational loss that the firm encounters. Similarly, a liability regime that rewards
the principal for self-reporting to the law enforcer should be designed carefully as it
might foster the level of corporate crime instead of limiting it. Moreover, a compli-
ance program-based leniency is inferior to a self-reporting based-leniency.
Finally, one of the limitations of our model is the assumption that the corporate
crime is the only mean for the principal to raise her expected surplus from the
task. Allowing for productive effort in a context where the choice of the monitoring
technology by the principal is endogenous could be a venue for future research. In
such a case, the transfers offered to the agent will be a double-edged sword (Goldman
and Slezak, 2006) that encourage him to exert productive effort but increase the
appeal of breaching the law. This conflict created by the incentives with the conflict
created by the monitoring technology and the reputational loss could bring us a
brighter picture of the design of incentives within the firm.
Appendix 2.A Proof of Proposition 2.1
In a full information benchmark, we assume that the principal can observe the
agent’s ability to use the unlawful technology, θi. Moreover, the monitoring technol-
ogy is costless which allows the principal to observe the agent’s decision to commit
the crime and to collect the evidence if the law is broken by the agent. Under these
assumptions, the principal can design a contract based on θi and on whether to use
the unlawful technology or not. We get the optimal contract by solving the game
in section 2.2.3 by backward induction. In the following, we will use "L" to stand
for "lawful technology" and "UNL" to stand for "unlawful technology".
If the agent proceeds lawfully, the principal’s problem becomes:
Max
t¯,tc
p [Π− tc]− t¯
subject to:
(PCL) : t¯+ p tc ≥ 0
(Limited liability) : t¯ ≥ 0, tc ≥ 0
where:
(PCL) is the participation constraint of the agent who proceeds lawfully.
In this case, the (PCL) binds and the optimal contract becomes: t¯∗L = 0 and
t∗cL = 0.
The principal’s payoff under this contract is:
p Π (2.4)
If the agent’s uses the unlawful technology, the principal will find the evidence
of misconduct with certainty and will disclose it to the law enforcer by assumption
2.1. The principal’s problem in this case becomes:
Max
t¯,tc
p(θi) [Π− tc]− t¯− F
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subject to:
(PCUNL) : t¯+ p(θi) tc − f ≥ 0
(Limited liability) : t¯ ≥ 0, tc ≥ 0
where:
(PCUNL) is the participation constraint of the agent who uses the unlawful technol-
ogy.
Given this problem, (PCUNL) binds. As a result, the non-contingent transfer is:
t¯UNL = f − p(θi) tc
Substituting t¯UNL into the principal’s problem, we get:
Max
tc
p(θi) [Π− tc]− f + p(θi) tc − F = p(θi)Π− f − F
Clearly, the contingent transfer is irrelevant in this problem, it can take any value.
This is because the principal can extract it completely through t¯UNL. For con-
venience, we will set tcUNL = 0. The optimal non-contingent transfer becomes:
t¯∗UNL = f . And the principal’s payoff is:
p(θi)Π− f − F (2.5)
By comparing, 2.4 and 2.5, we can determine the condition under which the principal
prefers that the agent uses the unlawful technology or not. Particularly, the principal
would refer to the unlawful technology if:
p(θi)Π− f − F ≥ p Π ⇒ p(θi) ≥ p+ F + f
Π

Appendix 2.B Proof of Proposition 2.2
In this section, we will study the case where the agent’s ability to use the unlawful
technology, θi, is not observed by the principal and the principal has to engage in
costly monitoring, C(γ), to discover the agent’s decision to commit the crime. As
discussed in section 2.4, the principal will design the contract and the investment in
monitoring in a way such that any agent with an ability level above a marginal one,
θ̂, would commit the crime and any agent with ability level below the marginal one
proceeds lawfully. The principal’s problem becomes:
Max
t¯,tc,γ
P (θ̂) (Π− tc)− t¯− C(γ)− [1−G(θ̂)] [γ F + (1− γ) α (F +R)]
subject to:
(PCL) : t¯+ p tc ≥ 0 ∀ θi < θ̂
(PCUNL) : t¯+ p(θi) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f ≥ 0 ∀ θi ≥ θ̂
(ICCL) : t¯+ p tc ≥ t¯+ p(θi) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f ∀ θi < θ̂
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(ICCUNL) : t¯+ p(θi) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f ≥ t¯+ p tc ∀ θi ≥ θ̂
(Limited liability) : t¯ ≥ 0, tc ≥ 0
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
where:
P (θ̂) = p
∫ θ̂
θ
g(θi) dθi +
∫ θ¯
θ̂
p(θi) g(θi) dθi
(ICCL) and (ICCUNL) stand for "incentive compatibility constraint of the agent
who uses the lawful and the unlawful technologies respectively.
As mentioned in footnote 9, implementing a screening mechanism according to
which the principal offers a different contract for different types of agents is not
feasible since the only decision that depends on the agent’s type is his decision to
commit the corporate crime which is not observed by the principal. Moreover, the
LHS of (PCUNL) is increasing with θi, which means that if (PCUNL) is satisfied for
the marginal agent, θ̂, it will be satisfied for any θi ≥ θ̂. The same reasoning applies
to (ICCUNL). For these reasons, we can restrict our attention to the (PCUNL) and
the (ICCUNL) of the the marginal type θ̂.
Furthermore, the analysis of the possible different cases shows that the only fea-
sible case is the one where (ICCUNL) and (ICCL) bind while (PCL) and (PCUNL)
do not. (ICCUNL) and (ICCL) can thus be reduced to one constraint (ICC).
The principal’s problem can be rewritten as follows:
Max
t¯,tc,γ
P (θ̂) (Π− tc)− t¯− C(γ)− [1−G(θ̂)] [γ F + (1− γ) α (F +R)]
subject to:
(PCL) : t¯+ p tc > 0 ∀ θi < θ̂
(PCUNL) : t¯+ p(θ̂) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f > 0
(ICC) : t¯+ p(θ̂) tc − [γ + (1− γ) α] f = t¯+ p tc
(Limited liability) : t¯ ≥ 0, tc ≥ 0
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
The marginal type, θ̂, can be defined from the (ICC):
p(θ̂) =
[γ + (1− γ) α] f
tc
+ p
Since ∂
2p
∂θ2i
(θi) = 0, there exists a one to one relationship between θ̂ and tc, we can
rewrite the previous equation as follows:
tc(γ, θ̂) =
[γ + (1− γ) α] f
p(θ̂)− p
(2.6)
Note that tc(γ, θ̂) > 0 always, satisfying thus one of the (Limited liability) con-
straints. It implies, as well, that (PCL) and (PCUNL) are always satisfied.
In addition, we can note that the principal’s problem is decreasing in t¯. As a result,
t¯ can be optimally set equal to 0, which satisfies the other (Limited liability) con-
straint.
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As final note, the one to one relationship between θ̂ and tc can allow us to switch
those variables in the principal’s problem.
The principal’s problem can be reduced to:
Max
θ̂,γ
P (θ̂) (Π− tc(γ, θ̂))− C(γ)− [1−G(θ̂)] [γ F + (1− γ) α (F +R)]
subject to:
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
where tc(γ, θ̂) is determined by equation 2.6.
We will get back to the constraint 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 later in subsection 2.B.1.
We can obtain an interior solution to the principal’s problem by relying on the
FOCs of the principal’s problem with respect to γ and θ. Let’s denote the optimal
marginal type and the optimal probability of detection that we get from this interior
solution by θ̂∗I and γ∗I respectively, where I stands for interior solution.
The FOCs24 of the problem are:
l(θ̂∗I , γ
∗
I ) = [1−G(θ̂∗I )] [α (F +R)− F ]−
∂C
∂γ
(γ∗I )− P (θ̂∗I )
∂tc
∂γ
(θ̂∗I ) = 0 (2.7)
h(θ̂∗I , γ
∗
I ) =
∂P
∂θi
(θ̂∗I )[Π−t(θ̂∗I , γ∗I )]−P (θ̂∗I )
∂tc
∂θi
(θ̂∗I , γ
∗
I )+
∂G
∂θi
{γ∗IF+(1−γ∗I )α(F+R)} = 0
(2.8)
By solving these two conditions, we can reach the optimal level of corporate crime
, 1 − G(θ̂∗I ) and the optimal probability of detection that determines in turn the
optimal level of investment in monitoring, C(γ∗I ).
The principal’s optimal payoff is:
P (θ̂∗I ) (Π− tc(γ∗I , θ̂∗I )− C(γ∗I )− [1−G(θ̂∗I )] [γ∗I F + (1− γ∗I ) α (F +R)]
The optimal non-contingent transfer is: t¯∗I = 0. And from 2.6, the optimal transfer,
t∗cI , is:
t∗cI = tc(γ
∗
I , θ̂
∗
I ) =
[γ∗I + (1− γ∗I ) α] f
p(θ̂∗I )− p
From (PCL), the optimal rent left to an agent with ability level, θi ≤ θ̂∗I , is:
ρ∗
I
= p t∗cI
And the optimal rent left to an agent with θi > θ̂∗I is:
ρ∗i = ρ
∗
I
+ [p(θi)− p(θ̂∗)] t∗
24In the text, they correspond to equations 2.2 and 2.3, respectively
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2.B.1 On constraint: 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
In this section, we will identify the conditions under which the constraint 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
is satisfied. Let’s consider equation 2.7 for a given value of θ̂, we can rearrange it as
follows:
[1−G(θ̂)] [α (F +R)− F ]− P (θ̂) ∂tc
∂γ
(θ̂) =
∂C
∂γ
(γ) (2.9)
Let’s consider the first part of the constraint: 0 ≤ γ. From equation 2.9, it will
be satisfied if:
[1−G(θ̂)] [α (F +R)− F ]− P (θ̂) ∂tc
∂γ
(θ̂) ≥ ∂C
∂γ
(0)
Given the assumption that ∂C
∂γ
(0) = 0 and from equation 2.6, we can rewrite the
previous inequality as:
[p(θ̂)− p][1−G(θ̂)] [α (F +R)− F ]− P (θ̂) (1− α) f ≥ 0
For sake of simplicity, let’s assume that θi ∼ U [θ, θ¯]. In that case, we can observe
that the LHS of the inequality is concave in θ̂. The condition can thus be satisfied
if the LHS has at least one root, which is the case if R exceeds certain threshold,
that we will denote by Rmin. If R > Rmin, 0 ≤ γ will be satisfied if θ̂ lies within the
roots of the LHS which we can denote by θ̂L and θ̂H . In other words, the interior
solution of the principal’s problem will satisfy the condition 0 ≤ γ if: R > Rmin
and θ̂∗I ∈ [θ̂L, θ̂H ].
As for the second part of the constraint, γ ≤ 1, we will follow a similar reasoning.
From 2.9, the constraint is satisfied if:
[1−G(θ̂)] [α (F +R)− F ]− P (θ̂) ∂tc
∂γ
(θ̂) ≤ ∂C
∂γ
(1)
From equation 2.6, we can rewrite the previous inequality as:
[p(θ̂)− p][1−G(θ̂)] [α (F +R)− F ]− P (θ̂) (1− α) f − [p(θ̂)− p] ∂C
∂γ
(1) ≤ 0
The LHS of the previous inequality is concave, implying that the inequality will be
satisfied if the LHS has at most one root, which the case if R is below a threshold
denoted by Rmax25.
In order to ensure that the constraint 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 is satisfied in our analysis,
we restricted our attention to the values of R ∈ [Rmin, Rmax]. Moreover, we relied
on corner solutions to the principal’s problem whenever θ̂∗I 6∈ [θ̂L, θ̂H ] to verify that
γ∗ ≥ 0.
In short, the optimal marginal type, θ̂∗, and the optimal probability of detection,
γ∗ of the principal’s problem can be summarized as follows:
25The thresholds Rmin, θ̂L, θ̂H and Rmax are easily specified if we consider functional forms
that satisfy the different assumptions of our model, as we will show in section 2.D.1.
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• θ̂∗ = θ̂L and γ∗ = 0 ∀ θ̂∗I < θ̂L
• θ̂∗ = θ̂∗I and γ∗ = γ∗I ∀ θ̂L ≤ θ̂∗I ≤ θ̂H .
• θ̂∗ = θ̂H and γ∗ = 0 ∀ θ̂∗I > θ̂H
We will show graphically in Appendix 2.D.2 that the principal’s problem has
corner solutions in the following cases:
1. If Π is small while R is sufficiently large, θ̂∗ = θ̂H since θ̂∗I > θ̂H or equivalently
1−G(θ̂∗I ) < 1−G(θ̂H).
We will show that 1−G(θ̂H) is decreasing with R. (See Figure 2.1 and Figure
2.3 ).
2. If Π is large while R is sufficiently small (R < RH1), θ̂∗ = θ̂L since θ̂∗I < θ̂L or
equivalently 1−G(θ̂∗I ) > 1−G(θ̂L).
We will show that 1−G(θ̂L) is increasing with R. (See Figure 2.5 and Figure
2.7 )

Appendix 2.C Proof of Propositions 2.3 and 2.4
2.C.1 Proposition 2.3, 2nd and 3rd points of Proposition 2.4
In this section we provide a proof of the comparative statics of θ̂∗ and γ∗ with respect
to R. The following proof applies as long as the solution to the problem is an interior
solution. For convenience, we will drop the subscript I from θ̂∗I and γ∗I .
Total derivatives
The proof of the comparative statics described in section 2.5 starts from the total
derivative of equations 2.7 and 2.8 with respect to R.
From equation 2.7, we get:
∂l
∂θ̂
dθ̂∗ +
∂l
∂γ
dγ∗ +
∂l
∂R
dR = 0
Dividing both sides by dR, we get:
∂l
∂θ̂
dθ̂∗
dR
+
∂l
∂γ
dγ∗
dR
+
∂l
∂R
= 0
which can be rearranged to be:
dγ∗
dR
= − 1
∂l
∂γ
[
∂l
∂θ̂
dθ̂∗
dR
+
∂l
∂R
]
(2.10)
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Similarly, we can derive dθ̂∗
dR
from 2.8:
dθ̂
dR
= − 1
∂h
∂θ̂
[
∂h
∂γ
dγ∗
dR
+
∂h
∂R
]
Substituting 2.10 in the previous equation we get:
dθ̂
dR
=
− 1∂h
∂θ̂
[
∂h
∂R
− ∂h
∂γ
∂l
∂R
1
∂l
γ
]
1− 1∂h
∂θ̂
∂h
∂γ
∂l
∂θ̂
1
∂l
∂γ
(2.11)
Signs of the components of equations 2.10 and 2.11
Second, to determine the sign of dθ̂∗
dR
and thus the sign of dγ
∗
dR
, we need to study the
sign of each component of the RHS of the two equations. From equations 2.7 and
2.8, we get that:
∂h
∂θ̂
(γ∗, θ̂∗) =
∂2P
∂θ̂2
[Π− t(γ∗, θ̂∗)]− 2 ∂P
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗)
∂t
∂θ̂
(γ∗, θ̂∗)− P (θ̂∗) ∂
2t
∂θ̂2
(γ∗, θ̂∗) (2.12)
∂h
∂θ̂
(γ∗, θ̂∗) < 0 if we assume that θi ∼ U [θ, θ¯].
∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) =
∂l
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗) = −G
θ̂
[αR− (1−α)F ]− ∂P
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗)
∂t
∂γ
(θ̂∗)− P (θ̂∗) ∂
2t
∂θ̂∂γ
(θ̂∗) (2.13)
∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) = ∂l
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗) > 0 if R < R˜(γ∗, θ̂∗) = 1
α
{(1 − α)F − 1∂G
∂θ
[∂P
∂θ
(θ̂∗) ∗ ∂t
∂γ
(θ̂∗) +
P (θ̂∗) ∂
2t
∂θ∂γ
(θ̂∗)]} and ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) = ∂l
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗) < 0 otherwise.
∂h
∂R
(γ∗) =
G
θ̂
(1− γ∗) α > 0 (2.14)
∂l
∂γ
= −∂
2C
∂γ2
< 0 (2.15)
∂l
∂R
(θ̂∗) = α G(θ̂∗) > 0 (2.16)
Sign of dθ̂
∗
dR
From 2.11, the sign of dθ̂∗
dR
depends on the sign of both the numerator and the
denominator:
Sign of the numerator. From 2.12, the sign of the first term,
(
− 1∂h
∂θ̂
)
, is always
positive. However, from equations 2.13, 2.15, 2.16 and 2.14, the sign of the second
term of the numerator will depend on the sign of ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗). We can thus distinguish
between two cases:
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1. If R < R˜(γ∗, θ̂∗), according to equation 2.13, ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) > 0. The second term is
positive and the numerator is positive as well.
2. If R < R˜(γ∗, θ̂∗), ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) < 0. The second term will be positive if:
∂h
∂R
− ∂h
∂γ
∂l
∂R
1
∂l
γ
> 0
From 2.13, we can rewrite the previous condition as follows:
R < RH2(γ
∗, θ̂∗) = R˜−
∂h
∂R
∂l
∂γ
α ∂G
∂θ
∂l
∂R
From 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16, RH2 > R˜
To summarize, the sign of the numerator of dθ̂∗
dR
depends on the value of R as
follows:
• If R ≤ RH2(γ∗, θ̂∗),
[
∂h
∂R
− ∂h
∂γ
∂l
∂R
1
∂l
γ
]
is positive.
• If R > RH2(γ∗, θ̂∗),
[
∂h
∂R
− ∂h
∂γ
∂l
∂R
1
∂l
γ
]
is negative.
Sign of the denominator. Since ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) = ∂l
∂θ̂
(θ̂∗), we can rewrite the denomina-
tor of dθ̂∗
dR
as follows:
1− 1
∂h
∂θ̂
(
∂h
∂γ
)2
1
∂l
∂γ
The denominator is thus positive if:
1− 1
∂h
∂θ̂
(
∂h
∂γ
)2
1
∂l
∂γ
> 0
which can be rewritten as:
−
√
∂h
∂θ̂
∂l
∂γ
≤ ∂h
∂γ
<
√
∂h
∂θ̂
∂l
∂γ
From 2.13, this condition can be expressed as:
R1(γ
∗, θ̂∗) = R˜− 1
α ∂G
∂θ
√
∂h
∂θ̂
∂l
∂γ
≤ R < R2(γ∗, θ̂∗) = R˜ + 1
α ∂G
∂θ
√
∂h
∂θ̂
∂l
∂γ
We will show below using numerical example and graphical representation (see Fig-
ure 2.9), that R1(γ∗, θ̂∗) < Rmin, i.e., R1(γ∗, θ̂∗) < R ∀R ∈ [Rmin, Rmax].
Moreover, we will show that for large values of Π, R2(γ∗, θ̂∗) > Rmax, implying
thus that R2(γ∗, θ̂∗) > R ∈ [Rmin, Rmax] (See Figure 2.11). However, for small values
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of Π, we will show that as long as we have an interior solution, i.e. θ̂∗ ∈ [θ̂L, θ̂H ],
R2(γ
∗, θ̂∗) > R (See Figure 2.10).
Therefore, as long as R ∈ [Rmin, Rmax] and the problem’s solution is an interior
solution, the denominator of dθ̂∗
dR
is always positive. The sign of the numerator of
dθ̂∗
dR
is the only determinant to its sign.
Finally, the sign of dθ̂∗
dR
varies based on two cases:
• If R ≤ RH2(γ∗, θ̂∗), dθ̂∗dR is positive.
• If R > RH2(γ∗, θ̂∗), dθ̂
∗
dR
is negative.
We will show later (See Figure 2.12) that RH2 is decreasing with Π. Therefore, for
low values of Π, Rmax < RH2(γ∗, θ̂∗) always, we get thus dθ̂
∗
dR
> 0, i.e., 1 − G(θ̂∗) is
decreasing with R for small values of Π.
However, for large values of Π, dθ̂∗
dR
can be either positive or negative depending on
the value of R.
Sign of dγ
∗
dR
From equation 2.10, and equation 2.15,
(
− 1∂l
∂γ
)
is positive. The sign of dγ
∗
dR
depends
thus on the signs of dθ̂∗
dR
and ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗). From the previous subsection and equation 2.13,
we can identify three cases:
1. If R ≤ R˜, both dθ̂∗
dR
and ∂h
∂γ
(θ̂∗) are positive, which implies that dγ
∗
dR
> 0.
2. If R˜ ≤ R < RH2, dθ̂∗dR > 0 while ∂h∂γ (θ̂∗) < 0. dγ
∗
dR
is positive if
∂l
∂θ̂
dθ̂∗
dR
+
∂l
∂R
> 0
From 2.13 and by re-arrenging the inequality, this condition can be rewritten
as:
R < RL(γ
∗, θ̂∗) = R˜−
∂l
∂R
∂h
∂θ̂
α ∂G
∂θ
∂h
∂R
From 2.16, 2.12 and 2.14, RL(γ∗, θ̂∗) > R˜.
Then, dγ
∗
dR
is positive if R < RL(γ∗, θ̂∗) and is negative otherwise.
We will show later (See Figure 2.13) that RL(γ∗, θ̂∗) is increasing with Π. For
low values of Π, dγ
∗
dR
might be positive or negative depending on whether R
is below or above the threshold RL(γ∗, θ̂∗). However, for large values of Π,
Rmax < RL(γ
∗, θ̂∗) always, implying that dγ
∗
dR
> 0 always.
3. If R ≥ RH2, both dθ̂∗dR and ∂h∂γ (θ̂∗) are negative, which implies that dγ
∗
dR
> 0.
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2.C.2 Note on 1st point of Proposition 2.4
As noted in Appendix 2.B.1, for R < RH1, the principal’s problem has a corner
solution. More precisely, θ̂∗ = θ̂L. We will show graphically in Appendix 2.D.2, that
the corporate crime at θ̂L (1−G(θ̂L)) is increasing with R for R < RH1.(See Figure
2.7). 
Appendix 2.D Numerical Example and Graphical
Representations
In this subsection, we will provide functional forms to our model’s functions and
numerical values to the variables in order to prove graphically the main points
raised in this section and that have been difficult to be proven using general forms.
2.D.1 Functional forms and numerical vales
Let’s consider the following functional form and numerical values for our analysis:
• p(θi) = 12 ∗ θi, θ = 1 and θ¯ = 2.
• θi ∼ U [1, 2] ⇒ g(θi) = 1, G(θi) = θi − 1 ⇒ P (θ̂) = 1/2 + 1/2 ∗ θ̂ −
1/4 ∗ θ̂2.
• C(γ) = nγ2, n > 0
Functional forms of Rmin, θ̂L, θ̂H and Rmax.
Given the functional forms described in the previous section and the proof in section
2.B.1, we can express Rmin, θ̂L, θ̂H and Rmax in the following functional forms:
• Rmin = 1α [(1− α)F + 3(1− α)f +
√
6(1− α)f ].
• θ̂L = 3[αR− (1−α)F ]− (1−α)f−
√
[αR− (1−α)F ]2− 6[αR− (1−α)F ]+3[(1−α)f ]2
2[αR− (1−α)F ]−(1−α)f .
• θ̂H = 3[αR− (1−α)F ]− (1−α)f+
√
[αR− (1−α)F ]2− 6[αR− (1−α)F ]+3[(1−α)f ]2
2[αR− (1−α)F ]−(1−α)f .
• Rmax = 1α [(1− α)F + 3(1− α)f + 2n2 +
√
3(1− α)f [3(1− α)f + 4n2]].
2.D.2 Graphical representations
For sake of graphical representations, let’s consider the following numerical values:
α = 0.6, n = 100, f = 500 and F = 5000. Given these values, Rmin = 5149.8 and
Rmax = 45872. Moreover, we will consider Π = 20000 and Π = 50000 as examples
of low values of Π, while Π = 75000 and Π = 100000 as examples of large values of
Π.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)), crime level at θ̂∗I and θ̂H , Π = 20000
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
R 104
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
1-
G
( h
at
)
1-G( hat* ),1-G( hat-I* ),1-G( hat-H) at =20000
1-G( hat* )
1-G( hat-I* )
1-G( hat-H)
Figure 2.2: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗), and probability of detection at θ̂∗I
(γ∗I ), Π = 20000
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Figure 2.3: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)), crime level at θ̂∗I and θ̂H , Π = 50000
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Figure 2.4: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗), and probability of detection at θ̂∗I
(γ∗I ), Π = 50000
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Figure 2.5: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)), crime level at θ̂∗I and θ̂H , Π = 75000
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Figure 2.6: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗), and probability of detection at θ̂∗I
(γ∗I ), Π = 75000
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Figure 2.7: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)), crime level at θ̂∗I and θ̂H , Π = 100000
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Figure 2.8: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗), and probability of detection at θ̂∗I
(γ∗I ), Π = 100000
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Figure 2.9: Rmin and R1 at Π = 20000, 50000, 75000, 100000
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Figure 2.10: R and R2 at Π = 20000, 50000
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Figure 2.11: Rmax and R2 at Π = 75000, 100000
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Figure 2.12: R and RH2 at Π = 20000, 50000, 75000, 100000
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Figure 2.13: R and RL at Π = 20000, 50000, 75000, 100000
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Figure 2.14: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)) under a strict liability regime (S = 0)
and under a compound liability regime (S = 1/2F, F ), Π = 50000
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Figure 2.15: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗) under a strict liability regime
(S = 0) and under a compound liability regime (S = 1/2F, F ), Π = 50000
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Figure 2.16: Optimal crime level (1−G(θ̂∗)) under a strict liability regime (S = 0)
and under a compound liability regime (S = 1/2F, F ), Π = 100000
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Figure 2.17: Optimal probability of detection (γ∗) under a strict liability regime
(S = 0) and under a compound liability regime (S = 1/2F, F ), Π = 100000
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Chapter 3
Corporate Crime: Incentives and
Deterrents
3.1 Introduction
The Facebook- Cambridge Analytica data scandal in 2018, the Volkswagen emission
scandal in 2015, the Enron and WorldCom scandals in early 2000s are examples of
crimes that have raised questions on the nature of corporate crime.
The corporate crime is distinguished from individual crime by its agency nature:
Although it is committed by an agent of the firm, the firm cannot distance itself
from the crime since it possesses several tools through which it can affect the agent’s
behavior. These tools vary between ex-ante tools, such as managerial incentives, and
ex-post tools such as auditing, monitoring and self-reporting.
Moreover, the firm is not insulated from its environment. The firm’s decision
depends on the interaction of the firm with many institutions: the legal rules, the
stakeholders’ preferences are other factors that affect the firm’s decision to tolerate
or to fight corporate misconduct.
This survey is an attempt to understand the main determinants of the corporate
crime. We will review the economics, the law and economics and the managerial
literature that considered the question of the corporate crime and its determinants.
The survey is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we review the impact of corporate
governance on the level of corporate crime. We will focus on the managerial incen-
tives (Section 3.2.1) as well as the organizational structure and the role of senior
managements (Section 3.2.2). In Section 3.3, we analyze the determinants of the
corporate crime that are exogenous to the firm, namely the legal deterrents (Section
3.3.1) and non-legal deterrents (Section 3.3.2).
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3.2 Opening the Black Box: Incentives and Deter-
rents within the Firm
In this section, we review the economic and managerial literature that studied the
impact of corporate governance on the tendency to commit a corporate crime. Cor-
porate governance as defined by Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2008) consists of "the set
of institutional arrangements that keep firm’s agency problems under control and
lead managers to pursue the shareholders’ interests rather than their own goals".
The corporate governance varies based on managerial incentives (Section 3.2.1), or-
ganizational hierarchy, corporate culture and internal enforcement (Section 3.2.2).
Hence, we will open the black box of the firm and investigate how different facets
of corporate governance affect the incentives of the various players within a corpo-
ration.
3.2.1 Managerial Incentives1
Managerial incentives play a key role in governing the agency relationship between
the firm or the shareholders (the Principal) and her manager (the Agent). These
incentives gain a particular importance when it comes to the corporate misconduct:
If they are not properly designed, they could fuel the criminal behavior.
We can distinguish between two main strands in the literature that consider the
design of managerial incentives in the context of harmful activities. The first strand
assigns to the agent (the manager) the discretion to undertake a corporate crime
(Section 3.2.1). In that case, breaching the law is thus a private decision of the
agent, while the principal can only affect it indirectly through the incentives offered
to the agent.
The other strand represents the agent as a "gatekeeper" (Section 3.2.1). The
term "gatekeeper" usually refers to auditors, lawyers, insurers and banks who mon-
itor or audit the firm independently (Mullin and Snyder, 2009). Even though, a
gatekeeper does not have the discretion to commit a corporate crime, his role is cru-
cial to facilitate the mission of the firm, e.g. by concealing the misconduct evidence
(Biswas et al., 2013). In this context, the decision and intensity of the crime are
solely determined by the principal who determines as well the type of contract to
be offered to the gatekeeper.
Reviewing these two strands of the literature gives an overview of the main
factors determining the design of the managerial incentives and the extent to which
they affect the corporate crime.
The Agent as a Criminal
The idea of allowing the agent to decide upon a criminal activity has been analyzed
by several papers (e.g. Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009; Goldman and Slezak, 2006;
Spagnolo, 2005; Crocker and Slemrod, 2004). However, a variety of frameworks has
1For sake of presentation, in this section, we will refer to the firm (the principal) using the
female form (she/her) and to the manager (the agent) using the male form (he/him).
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been adopted to study the different aspects related to corporate crime and the design
of managerial incentives.
Multitask moral hazard and the role of enforcement. A strand of the lit-
erature has studied the corporate crime through the lens of a multitask moral haz-
ard problem. This approach can be applied to several corporate crimes, such as
misselling of a product where a marketing agent provides misleading information
regarding the suitability of a product to a customer (Inderst and Ottaviani, 2009),
financial fraud where the manager manipulates the financial statements of a firm to
inflate its value (Goldman and Slezak, 2006; David Robison and Santore, 2011; An-
dergassen, 2008) or market collusion where the manager engages in cartel activities
(Aubert, 2009).
These models consist of three players2: A principal, an agent and a customer.
The principal aims to maximize his profit from selling a product to the customer.
For this purpose, she hires an agent in exchange of a payment contract that is based
on his performance (e.g., a stock-based compensation, an equity, or a commission
based on profit target). Here, the agent can affect the principal’s profit by exerting
two types of effort that cannot be observed by the principal: a productive effort
that enhances the value of the product but it is costly and may lead to a stochastic
outcome, and a criminal effort, which aims to mislead the customer about the value
of the product by inflating it. Although this criminal effort does not entail a cost per
se, but the agent might face an individual sanction if this criminal effort is detected.
Moreover, the criminal effort might entail direct costs on the firm (e.g., through the
diversion of some resources instead of using them productively), and a reputational
loss that occurs in case of detection. Expecting the criminal behavior, the customer
adjusts his valuation of the product to account for the expected criminal behavior,
thus reducing his willingness to pay and implying lower price in equilibrium.
The principal designs the payment contract to deter any criminal effort as much
as possible and provide incentives to exert productive effort. Nevertheless, the per-
formance is an imperfect signal that depends positively on both types of effort,
thus creating a conflict between them: While increasing the power of the incentives
induces productive effort, it encourages the criminal one3. Therefore, raising the
power of the incentives becomes costly for the firm, as a result of the direct costs
and the expected losses that the firm might face. Accordingly, the principal reduces
the power of the incentives, as compared to a situation where the agent can only
rely on productive effort.
2In Aubert (2009), the model is slightly different: The principal’s profit depends on the market
strategy adopted by the manager rather than the equilibrium price that results from the supply
and the demand of a product. Moreover, the criminal effort consists of adopting a market strategy
different from the one recommended by the principal. However, the main results discussed in
section 3.2.1 hold. Similarly, Andergassen (2008) consists of two players. The main source of
conflict is that the principal and the agent’s payoffs are realized in different time horizons: The
agent receives his compensation at time t = 2 before the direct harm of the criminal effort takes
place at time t = 3. The principal cannot thus incorporate this cost in the agent’s payoff.
3This result holds as long as the productive and the criminal efforts are technically independent
in the agent’s payoff. However, if there exist interdependencies between the two efforts, the impact
of increasing the power of the incentives on the level of criminal and productive efforts is not
obvious (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006)
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In this context, we can assess the impact of an increase in the probability of
crime detection. Generally speaking, a higher probability of detection would deter
the agent from exerting criminal effort. If the detection of the misconduct is not
associated with a reputational loss for the principal, this deterrent effect would
encourage the principal to raise the power of the incentives. However, these higher
incentives may counteract the deterrent effect of the increase of the probability of
detection, leading finally to higher levels of criminal effort4(Goldman and Slezak,
2006). If the principal risks her reputation after the detection, the effect of higher
probability of detection on the incentives is ambiguous. That is, in addition to the
indirect effect that stems from the reduction in the criminal effort, which encourages
the principal to provide high-powered incentives, a direct effect comes into play:
The possibility of loosing the reputation after a detection makes it costly to raise
the incentives (David Robison and Santore, 2011).
Finally, an increase in the direct costs of the criminal effort pushes the firm to
lower the power of the incentives offered to her agent, in order to limit the negative
impact the criminal effort has on her payoff (Andergassen, 2008).
Incentive schemes and the sustainability of collusion. What distinguishes
the market collusion from other corporate crimes is its multiplayer nature. There-
fore, the sustainability of collusion is not a decision of a single firm, but requires
that no cartel member has incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement. In-
deed, deviation depends on how much the firm discounts her future profits and the
retaliation strategy supporting the agreement. If the firm delegates its market strat-
egy to an agent, the sustainability of the collusion will depend on the payoff of the
agent rather than that of the firm. Accordingly, if the agent’s payoff departs from
the payoff of a profit maximizing firm, we might have cases where the collusion is
sustainable while it wouldn’t have been so when the firm was determining its the
market strategy directly.
Spagnolo (2000, 2005) analyzes this idea by abstracting from the moral hazard
concerning the productive effort and disregarding the legal and direct costs that the
collusion might entail. Particularly, he specifies two main instances in which the
delegation of the market strategy decision helps to sustain a collusive agreement.
First, when the agent exhibits a preference for income smoothing, the collusion is
more likely to be sustained. For example, if the agent is averse to the profit variance,
the deviation will be less attractive since the higher profit he gets by deviating is
followed by lower profits in subsequent periods. A similar effect could be perceived
when particular incentives schemes are used, such as long term bonus contracts
characterized by a bonus cap. In these contracts, the agent receives a fixed wage as
long as the profit is below a certain threshold. When this threshold is reached, the
agent starts to get a bonus. By properly defining this threshold, the principal can
induce collusion at any discount factor. The reason is that, based on this contract,
an agent has no incentive to deviate since he will receive a lower compensation by
doing so. The same behavior can be observed based on a short term capped bonus
contract or a contract consisting of offering a rent associated with a termination
4The net effect of the higher probability of detection on the level of criminal effort depends on
the elasticity of the incentives to the probability of detection (Goldman and Slezak, 2006).
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threat if a profit threshold is not achieved (Spagnolo, 2005).
Second, if the agent is offered a stock-based compensation, deviation is less likely
to occur, as compared to when he receives a profit-based compensation. Indeed, the
stock price captures not only the current profit but also the flow of future profits.
Therefore, a stock-based compensation is affected more than a profit-based one by
the deviation from a collusive agreement. This observation is true for different forms
of incentives related to stock price, in both cases when the incentives are deferred or
paid before the distribution of dividends. Examples of stock-based compensations
include "small" compensation packages that do not affect the stock price, "large"
compensation packages or stock-options where the agent can buy a certain number
of shares at a predetermined price (Spagnolo, 2000).
The Agent as a Gatekeeper
This strand of literature considers an agent who plays a less active role in the deci-
sion of committing the corporate crime. However, his role remains necessary for the
principal who determines not only the desirability of the crime but also its intensity.
This stuy approach has been applied to corporate tax evasion, mainly to analyze
the impact of gatekeeper liability on the design of the contract between the firm and
the agent.
The agent in Chen and Chu (2005) is risk averse. He prepares the tax return
and exerts a productive effort that affects the principal’s payoff. In exchange, he
receives a payment contract based on the reported income to the tax authority.
The principal’s decision to underreport the taxable income imposes a risk on the
agent, specifically if he will be held liable for this misconduct: Due to the illegal
nature of the tax evasion, the principal cannot insure the agent through a contract
that is contingent on the detection of the illegal act. Alternatively, in addition to
the payment contract described above, the principal would offer the agent a service
contract. This latter consists of providing an additional remuneration based on the
difference between the actual and the reported income and a risk premium. There-
fore, if the principal desires to induce a higher level of effort, this risk premium will
be the source of an additional cost, leading thus to internal control inefficiencies. In
particular, compared to a case where the agent is not liable for tax evasion (i.e., the
source of risk is absent), if the agent exhibits increasing risk aversion with income,
the principal will reduce the power of the incentives provided to the agent, reducing
the level of productive effort in equilibrium. However, decreasing risk aversion with
income would implies higher power incentives with overprovision of effort. Finally,
constant risk aversion with income will not alter the level of effort provided in equi-
librium.
Biswas et al. (2013) consider an agent who is risk averse as well but plays a more
active role in the process of tax evasion. He gets a remuneration for exerting an ef-
fort to reduce the probability of detecting the principal’s misconduct. It is assumed
that the effort is fully observable by the principal. Holding the agent liable exposes
him to a risk. As a response, the agent engages in higher levels of effort in order
to avoid the expected sanction, which benefits the principal and reduces the cost of
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tax evasion. Nevertheless, the higher effort requires higher compensation in addition
to the compensation for the risk that the agent is facing. The result of extending
the liability to the agent is thus ambiguous: On the one hand, if the agent faces
high sanction or high risk aversion, the second effect dominates: The principal will
prefer to reduce the level of effort by reducing the remuneration offered to the agent,
and lower tax evasion will result. On the other hand, if the individual sanction is
low or the agent exhibits low risk aversion, the first effect dominates, which can be
interpreted then as "excessive loyalty". The higher protection that results from the
higher levels of effort encourages the principal to raise the agent’s remuneration and
the amount of tax evaded.
3.2.2 Other Forms of Corporate Governance
The role of the corporate governance in controlling corporate crime is not limited
to the managerial incentives, but it goes beyond it.
Organizational structure. The complexity of the organizational structure is one
of the factors facilitating the corporate crime. By complexity we mean "the degree of
spread and segmentation in the organization’s structure" (Dugan and Gibbs, 2009).
Therefore, the more complex the corporate structure is, the more difficult the co-
ordination and the diffusion of information will be, which increases the agency cost
(Abrantes-Metz and Sokol, 2013). As a result, it becomes more difficult for law en-
forcers to detect the crime and to prosecute the wrongdoer since the decentralization
of the tasks distribute the responsibilities between several managers. This requires
the adaptation of the enforcement tools to account for these aspects by encouraging
whistle-blowing, improving prevention measures and coordination between several
law enforcement units (Dugan and Gibbs, 2009).
Moreover, this complex structure implies that each division of the corporation
aims to achieve a specific performance target. Hence, the objective function of the
managers might depart from that of the shareholders and committing the corporate
crime could be a tool to achieve it (Abrantes-Metz and Sokol, 2013).
Role of senior management. Senior managers play a key role in shaping the
firm’s objectives. They hold the power to decide upon the strategic variables of
the firm (Abrantes-Metz and Sokol, 2013). Consequently, they might affect the
corporate crime in several ways.
First, committing the corporate crime could be the decision of the top manage-
ment as in the case of antitrust violations (Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2008). However,
this discretion regarding the corporate crime could be undermined if appropriate
measures were taken by the board of directors who monitors those senior managers.
Among these measures are securing the independence of the board of directors by
limiting the possibility that a top manager holds the leadership of the board. In
this way, the potential conflict of interest that may arise is avoided and the board of
directors will pursue the objectives of the shareholders. Another measure consists
of aligning the objectives of the top managers with those of the shareholders by
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allowing for insider ownership. However, the managers’ share need to be designed
with caution. Although ownership increases the senior managers’ incentives to raise
the firm value, a high share could create an "entrenchment effect": The managers
could reject projects that do not benefit them even if they increase the firm’s value
(Boubakri, 2011).
Second, senior managers can affect the incentives of middle managers to commit
corporate crime through the design of both the managerial incentives (See section
3.2.1), the corporate culture and compliance programs. Indeed, by dedicating fi-
nancial resources to compliance programs, organizing continuous training for the
middle management and providing power to compliance officers, senior managers
can promote a culture of compliance in the corporation (Abrantes-Metz and Sokol,
2013).
Corporate culture. Corporate culture governs the relation between the firm
and its stakeholders. Hence, it determines the extent to which the firm would pursue
its economic, legal and ethical responsibilities (Maignan and Ferrell, 2001). Indeed,
the dominating culture determines whether the compliance to the legal rules is an
integral part of the corporation or in contrast is just a "system to beat in pursuit of
sales and commission" (Abrantes-Metz and Sokol, 2013).
If the corporate culture underlines the ethical value of compliance, it could im-
prove the deterrence of corporate crime. For instance, if the culture endorses com-
pliance, the perpetrator will be subject to moral stigma upon the detection of the
wrongdoing. This would definitely increase the expected cost of the crime and may
discourage him from committing it. The corporate culture could thus reduce the
cost of detection. Moreover, the dominance of a compliance culture could empower a
whistle-blower to report the misconduct, an action he wouldn’t have done otherwise
since he might end up loosing his job (Abrantes-Metz and Sokol, 2013).
Compliance programs and codes of conduct. The aim of implementing
compliance programs by the firms is to identify and to reduce the risk of commit-
ting a corporate crime by its agents(OECD, 2009). Compliance programs consists
of ex-ante and ex-post measures. Nevertheless, the sole implementation of these
programs does not guarantee its effectiveness and even large investments in compli-
ance programs is not necessarily a sign of fighting the corporate crime5 (Krawiec,
2003). The implementation of the program should be coupled with the dedication
of adequate resources and the commitment of top management in order to fight the
crime. In general, a compliance program consists of two components: First, a code
of conduct that states the firm’s commitment to the ethical standards and practices
(OECD, 2009). A comprehensive and clear code of conduct is necessary to guide
the agents about the actions that need to be avoided (Schnatterly, 2003). Second,
due diligence procedures that aims to screen and investigate potential agents for
possible red flags, to detail the tasks required in the contract and to monitor and
audit the agent regularly (OECD, 2009).
5See Chapter 2 for formal analysis of this result.
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3.3 Outside the Black Box: Incentives and Deter-
rents Outside the Firm
The incentives and the measures adopted by the firm to discipline its agent are
not the only factors affecting the level of corporate crime. Indeed, other factors
exogenous to the firm might determine the firm’s willingness to fight the corporate
crime. Some of these factors are legal (Section 3.3.1), such as the liability regime
the firm is subject to and the availability of leniency programs. Other factors are
non-legal (Section 3.3.2), e.g., the reputational loss, the market sanctions and the
corporate social responsibility.
3.3.1 Legal Deterrents
In this section, we briefly review the main questions raised in the law and economics
and the economics literature6 regarding the legal aspects of the corporate crime.
Their analysis have focused mainly on the issue of the optimal design of enforcement
tools.
Corporate and individual liability. The ultimate aim of imposing liability on
either the corporation or the agent is to achieve the level of corporate crime that
is socially optimal by incorporating the social cost of the crime in the wrongdoers
objective functions. This can be done directly by imposing an expected fine equal
to the social cost of the crime to the agent as in the case of individual liability,
or indirectly by inducing the firm to adjust its corporate policing measures (e.g.,
investigation, detection, self-reporting and cooperation with law enforcer) and the
incentives offered to the agent as in the case of corporate liability (Arlen, 2012).
Both types of liability are equivalent if some conditions apply. Namely, if the firm
does not get any benefit from the crime, if neither the firm nor the agent face a
limited liability and if the reallocation of the sanction is possible through the com-
pensation/indemnification contracts. In case of violation of one of these conditions,
imposing a joint liability will be the optimal solution (Buccirossi and Spagnolo,
2008).
For instance, if the firm is closely held or small publicly held, it is likely that the
firm suffers from a limited liability. Therefore, imposing a full sanction that is equal
to the social harm becomes impossible. As a consequence, the level of transfers
offered to the agent will be suboptimal and will not lead to optimal deterrence.
This is a case where the corporate liability should be associated with individual
liability (Arlen, 2012). Similarly, in publicly held firms, the agency cost and contract
inefficiencies might hinder the reallocation of the full sanction to the agent, leading
to underdeterrence of the corporate crime (Crocker and Slemrod, 2004). Finally, the
firm might lack the tools to impose large sanctions to the agent due to the agent’s
limited liability. In that case, the individual liability allows the intervention of the
law enforcer who could impose harsher penalties such as imprisonment(Buccirossi
and Spagnolo, 2008).
6For a comprehensive review of the Law and Economics literature on corporate crime, see
Mullin and Snyder (2009).
71
CHAPTER 3. CORPORATE CRIME: INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS
By the same token, relying on the individual liability alone may not be sufficient
to deter the corporate crime. Particularly, if the agent is judgment proof, the ability
to internalize the social cost of the crime through the individual fines is limited.
In the absence of corporate liability, the firm might be reluctant to provide the
adequate incentives for the agent (Hiriart and Martimort, 2006) or to adjust the
its policing tools and to invest in monitoring (Arlen, 2012) to avoid the corporate
crime.
Finally, in some cases, delegating the enforcement to the firm is cost effective.
Indeed, the firm is better positioned to run investigations than an outsider since
it has better information on the work procedures. In addition, the firm can take
several measures ex-ante (e.g., due diligence during the hiring process, design of the
incentives) and ex-post (regular monitoring and audit)7to deter the corporate crime.
Corporate liability regime. The aim of corporate liability regimes is to induce
the firm to internalize the social cost of its agent’s corporate crime and to undertake
optimal prevention and policing measures to achieve the socially optimal level of
corporate crime as well as the socially optimal production level (Arlen and Kraak-
man, 1997). The literature has studied the optimality of various liability regimes,
namely the strict liability regime, the duty-based liability regime, the composite
liability regime (Arlen and Kraakman, 1997) and the compound corporate liability
regime (Oded, 2011). In the following, we will present the main features of each of
these regimes.
Under a strict corporate liability regime, the firm is strictly liable for the miscon-
duct of its agent as long as the violation has occurred within the scope of the agency
contract. The strict liability applies regardless of the prevention and the policing
measures undertaken by the firm (Oded, 2011). The merit of this regime is that it
encourages the firm to adopt optimal policing measures, which contributes to the
deterrence of the crime by increasing the crime’s expected cost to the agent (deter-
rence effect). Nevertheless, it has the perversive effect of increasing the expected
liability of the firm for the undeterred crimes (liability enhancement effect) (Arlen,
1994). This latter effect undermines the firm’s incentives to adopt costly policing
measures (Oded, 2011).
Unlike the strict liability regime, the duty-based liability regime takes into consid-
eration the prevention and policing measures implemented by the firm. Particularly,
the firm is deemed liable for the corporate crimes committed by its employees only
if it fails to fulfill the duties set by the law. These duties are usually related to self
policing: the optimal prevention, deterrence, self-reporting and cooperation with
law enforcer. The main drawback of this regime is that it does not allow the firm
to internalize the social cost of the crime if it satisfies the due-care level required by
the law, leading to suboptimal levels of production. Moreover, this regime requires
considerable administrative costs to determine the socially optimal level of due care
and to evaluate the measures taken by the firm. The asymmetry of information
between the firm and the law enforcer adds to the drawbacks of this regime(Oded,
2011).
7We discuss these measures in details in section 3.2.2.
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Arlen and Kraakman (1997) have introduced the composite liability regime as a
regime that overcomes the drawbacks of the previous ones. This regime consists of
imposing a strict liability on the firms for the misconduct of their agents if they fail
to satisfy the due-care level and imposing a reduced sanction on the firms that fulfill
(fully or partially) the required measures by the law (Arlen, 2012). Accordingly,
it provides the firm with incentives to invest in socially optimal self-policing while
internalizing the social harm of the crime. Nevertheless, like the duty-based regimes,
the burden of determining the due-care level and the asymmetry of information
between the firm and the law enforcer are the main concerns related to this regime.
The compound liability regime is similar to the composite liability regime, in sense
that it imposes a base sanction on any firm violating the law and a reduced sanction
on firms that satisfy optimal self-policing. The main difference is that it exploits the
idea that self-reporting reduces the variable enforcement costs necessary to detect
the corporate misconduct. According to this regime, a firm that is deemed liable
will face a sanction equivalent to the social harm and the variable enforcement costs,
while a firm that self–report will face only a sanction equal to the social harm. In
that way, the firm’s incentives to implement self-enforcement measures are adjusted
to incorporate the social consequences of these measures (Oded, 2011).
It is worthy to note that the composite liability regime is the closest liability
regime to the one adopted by the US sentencing guidelines (Oded, 2011). However,
the mitigation of the sanction and the determination of the suitability of the mea-
sures undertaken by the firm are left to the discretionary power of the law enforcer
(Arlen and Kahan, 2017), strengthening thus the drawbacks highlighted above.
Another feature of the liability regime adopted in practice is the possibility to
impose ex-post mandates through the pre-trial diversion agreements (PDA). The
PDA are usually imposed on the firms that have committed a corporate crime while
having implemented an ineffective compliance program. The aim of these mandates
is to induce the firm to undertake new measures to improve its self-policing strategies
(e.g., by altering the internal governance, investing substantial amounts in compli-
ance programs). These mandates are firm specific and the firm is deemed liable for
failing to satisfy these new duties even if no harm has resulted. According to Arlen
and Kahan (2017), these mandates are useful only if the corporate crime was due
to policing agency cost, i.e., the top management benefits from the wrongdoing and
from the absence of effective self-enforcement measures. Otherwise, those mandates
will result into inefficient spendings.
Leniency programs. Leniency programs were shown to be effective in crimes
that involve multiple parties8. In particular, leniency programs aim to exploit the
opportunistic behavior of the involved parties by offering a fine reduction (or possibly
positive rewards) in exchange of insider information. This allows the law enforcer
to reduce the enforcement costs while ensuring higher deterrence rates (Spagnolo,
2008; Buccirossi and Spagnolo, 2006).
8In this section, we focus on the impact of leniency programs on crimes that involve a vertical
relationship between the players (i.e., agency relationship). Nevertheless, leniency programs are
applied as well to crimes with horizontal relationship between the players, such as market collusion.
For a comprehensive review of the literature on the latter point, see Spagnolo (2008).
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As discussed in the previous point, corporate liability regimes that guarantee
a mitigation of the sanction when the firm self-reports, such as the composite lia-
bility or the compound liability regimes, encourage the firm to optimally invest in
self-enforcement, which in turn ensures optimal level of deterrence. By the same
token, Angelucci and Han (2010) find that a marginal decrease in the corporate fine
(i.e., a partial corporate leniency) would increase the effectiveness of the compli-
ance program implemented by the firm: The fine reduction encourages the firm to
cooperate with the law enforcer by disclosing the information it gets by monitor-
ing the agent. This increases the expected managerial sanction, reducing thus the
manager’s incentive to commit the corporate crime.
Fine reductions can be offered as well to the individuals involved in the corporate
crime, which is known as individual leniency programs. However, leniency programs
that target the individuals are not always effective. From the one hand, inducing
the agent to breach the law becomes more expensive since higher incentives (bribes)
should be provided to him to prevent his application for leniency. The corporate
crime becomes even more costly when the leniency program offers positive rewards
and not just a fine reduction (Aubert et al., 2006). On the other hand, inducing
the agent to comply with the law becomes more costly as well: Breaching the law
becomes more attractive to the agent who can breach the law and then apply for
leniency to enjoy the fine reduction. Hence, higher incentives should be provided to
the agent (Angelucci and Han, 2010; Aubert, 2009). Individual leniency programs
should be thus designed with caution to avoid this perverse effect.
When corporate leniency programs are coupled with individual leniency pro-
grams, an improvement in the deterrence level could be observed. The implementa-
tion of both the corporate and the individual leniency programs could create a "race
to the courthouse" between the firms and the agent : Each party has incentive to
avoid facing the full sanction, which lead to higher deterrence levels. Moreover, some
complementarity in deterrence could be perceived between corporate and individual
leniency programs. For instance, if a firm deviates from the collusive agreement and
its agent has the opportunity to apply for an individual leniency program. The firm
will face two options: either to leave higher rent to the agent to deter him from the
application to the program or to apply to the corporate leniency program once it
deviates. Clearly, the presence of the individual leniency program has made the ap-
plication to the corporate leniency program more appealing for the firm (Buccirossi
and Spagnolo, 2008).
3.3.2 Non-legal Deterrents
In this section, we review the non-legal deterrents that affect the firm’s decision to
commit the corporate crime. We will focus mainly on the corporate reputation and
the corporate social responsibility.
Corporate reputation. A corporation that gets involved in a corporate crime
might be subject to reputational penalty. This reputational loss is a market penalty,
it is translated through the fall of the stock price of the firm (Alexander, 1999). This
loss in the firm’s value occurs as the stakeholders of the firm, namely the customers,
74
CHAPTER 3. CORPORATE CRIME: INCENTIVES AND DETERRENTS
the lenders and the suppliers, are less likely to deal with a firm known by its criminal
behavior (Arlen, 2012).
Indeed, three features characterize these reputational penalties (Arlen, 2012).
First, the value and the severity of the loss depend on the type of the crime and
the type of stakeholder affected. Generally speaking, crimes that concern related
parties (direct stakeholders) (e.g., fraud), are more likely to induce a reputational
loss than crimes that affect third parties (e.g., environmental crimes) (Karpoff et al.,
2005). Other factor that might affect the severity of the reputational loss as well
is the quality of the corporate governance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2009). Second,
this penalty does not depend on formal conviction. Yet, it occurs once the market
receives credible information about the crime. Third, the firm can take some steps
to reduce the reputational loss.
It is worthy to note that the reputational loss is a kind of strict corporate li-
ability (Arlen, 2012) and sometimes it is sufficiently high to generate the optimal
total sanction (Alexander, 1999). Therefore, the optimal sanction need to be ad-
justed either downward (upward) to account for this reputational loss and to avoid
overdeterrence (underdeterrence) (Garoupa, 2000).
Corporate social responsibility. The question of corporate social responsibility
has always been studied as the tendency of the firm to "do good". However, another
facet of the corporate social responsibility of the firm is to "avoid bad" (Lin-Hi
and Müller, 2013). In this context corporate crime can be perceived as a form of
"corporate social irresponsibility". Therefore, we can adopt the same tools used to
study the firm’s corporate social responsibility to understand the firm’s motives to
avoid the corporate crime as form of "corporate social irresponsibility". For instance,
the profit maximizing firm might have incentive to deter corporate crime in order
to avoid negative advertisement and negative perception by its customers, or to
avoid the reduction in sales that might be led by consumers with social preference.
Moreover, the firm could aim to attract investors with social preferences who might
be discouraged from investing in a firm that promotes corporate crime (Schmitz and
Schrader, 2015). Finally, deterring corporate crime could be a mean to protect the
firm’s reputation (Crifo and Forget, 2015).
3.4 Conclusion
We have presented a review of the economic, law and economics and managerial
literature that considered the question of corporate crime and particularly the in-
centives and the deterrents that affect the firm’s decision to undertake a corporate
crime.
We can derive some general conclusions regarding the determinants of the corpo-
rate crime. The agency problem between the firm and the manager can undermine
the effectiveness of some enforcement measures. This could be interpreted either by
the link between the managerial incentives and the level of corporate crime or by
the manager’s risk preference. Moreover, the role of the top managers in controlling
the corporate crime is crucial. They design the main tools affecting the enforcement
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within the firm, which in turn affects the incentives of the middle managers to com-
mit the crime. Therefore, ensuring that their incentives are aligned with those of
the shareholders is important.
As for the deterrents determined outside the firm, we can conclude that a joint
liability between the corporation and the manager is optimal. The compound liabil-
ity regime is the liability regime that allows the firm to internalize the social harm
of the corporate crime and to undertake optimal self-enforcement measures, which
ensures optimal deterrence of crime and optimal levels of production. Furthermore,
relying on individual and corporate leniency programs could enhance the level of
deterrence of corporate crime.
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